kernel_optimize_test/arch/um/kernel/exec.c

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/*
* Copyright (C) 2000 - 2007 Jeff Dike (jdike@{addtoit,linux.intel}.com)
* Licensed under the GPL
*/
#include "linux/stddef.h"
#include "linux/fs.h"
#include "linux/smp_lock.h"
#include "linux/ptrace.h"
#include "linux/sched.h"
#include "asm/current.h"
#include "asm/processor.h"
#include "asm/uaccess.h"
uml: fix stub address calculations The calculation of CONFIG_STUB_CODE and CONFIG_STUB_DATA didn't take into account anything but 3G/1G and 2G/2G, leaving the other vmsplits out in the cold. I'd rather not duplicate the four known host vmsplit cases for each of these symbols. I'd also like to calculate them based on the highest userspace address. The Kconfig language seems not to allow calculation of hex constants, so I moved this to as-layout.h. CONFIG_STUB_CODE, CONFIG_STUB_DATA, and CONFIG_STUB_START are now gone. In their place are STUB_CODE, STUB_DATA, and STUB_START in as-layout.h. i386 and x86_64 seem to differ as to whether an unadorned constant is an int or a long, so I cast them to unsigned long so they can be printed consistently. However, they are also used in stub.S, where C types don't work so well. So, there are ASM_ versions of these constants for use in stub.S. I also ifdef-ed the non-asm-friendly portion of as-layout.h. With this in place, most of the rest of this patch is changing CONFIG_STUB_* to STUB_*, except in stub.S, where they are changed to ASM_STUB_*. defconfig has the old symbols deleted. I also print these addresses out in case there is any problem mapping them on the host. The two stub.S files had some trailing whitespace, so that is cleaned up here. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Jeff Dike <jdike@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 16:27:33 +08:00
#include "as-layout.h"
#include "mem_user.h"
#include "skas.h"
#include "os.h"
void flush_thread(void)
{
void *data = NULL;
unsigned long end = proc_mm ? TASK_SIZE : STUB_START;
int ret;
arch_flush_thread(&current->thread.arch);
ret = unmap(&current->mm->context.id, 0, end, 1, &data);
if (ret) {
printk(KERN_ERR "flush_thread - clearing address space failed, "
"err = %d\n", ret);
force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
}
__switch_mm(&current->mm->context.id);
}
void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long eip, unsigned long esp)
{
set_fs(USER_DS);
PT_REGS_IP(regs) = eip;
PT_REGS_SP(regs) = esp;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TTY_LOG
extern void log_exec(char **argv, void *tty);
#endif
static long execve1(char *file, char __user * __user *argv,
char __user *__user *env)
{
long error;
#ifdef CONFIG_TTY_LOG
[PATCH] tty: ->signal->tty locking Fix the locking of signal->tty. Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current' or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway. (NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules) Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access). It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing. (NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info invocations) [schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix] [akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 18:36:04 +08:00
struct tty_struct *tty;
mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
[PATCH] tty: ->signal->tty locking Fix the locking of signal->tty. Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current' or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway. (NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules) Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access). It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing. (NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info invocations) [schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix] [akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 18:36:04 +08:00
tty = get_current_tty();
if (tty)
log_exec(argv, tty);
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
#endif
error = do_execve(file, argv, env, &current->thread.regs);
if (error == 0) {
task_lock(current);
current->ptrace &= ~PT_DTRACE;
#ifdef SUBARCH_EXECVE1
SUBARCH_EXECVE1(&current->thread.regs.regs);
#endif
task_unlock(current);
}
return error;
}
long um_execve(char *file, char __user *__user *argv, char __user *__user *env)
{
long err;
err = execve1(file, argv, env);
if (!err)
UML_LONGJMP(current->thread.exec_buf, 1);
return err;
}
long sys_execve(char __user *file, char __user *__user *argv,
char __user *__user *env)
{
long error;
char *filename;
lock_kernel();
filename = getname(file);
error = PTR_ERR(filename);
if (IS_ERR(filename)) goto out;
error = execve1(filename, argv, env);
putname(filename);
out:
unlock_kernel();
return error;
}