kernel_optimize_test/security/selinux/ss/mls.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
*
* Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/*
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
*
* Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
*/
/*
* Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
*
* Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
*
* (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include "sidtab.h"
#include "mls.h"
#include "policydb.h"
#include "services.h"
/*
* Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
* security context string representation of `context'.
*/
int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
{
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
int i, l, len, head, prev;
char *nm;
struct ebitmap *e;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 0;
len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
/* categories */
head = -2;
prev = -2;
e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
if (i - prev > 1) {
/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
if (head != prev) {
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
head = i;
}
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
prev = i;
}
if (prev != head) {
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
if (l == 0) {
if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
&context->range.level[1]))
break;
else
len++;
}
}
return len;
}
/*
* Write the security context string representation of
* the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
* Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
*/
void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
char **scontext)
{
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
char *scontextp, *nm;
int i, l, head, prev;
struct ebitmap *e;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return;
scontextp = *scontext;
*scontextp = ':';
scontextp++;
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS,
context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
/* categories */
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
head = -2;
prev = -2;
e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
if (i - prev > 1) {
/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
if (prev != head) {
if (prev - head > 1)
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
if (prev < 0)
*scontextp++ = ':';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
head = i;
}
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
prev = i;
}
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
if (prev != head) {
if (prev - head > 1)
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
if (l == 0) {
if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
&context->range.level[1]))
break;
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
else
*scontextp++ = '-';
}
}
*scontext = scontextp;
return;
}
int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
{
struct level_datum *levdatum;
if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
return 0;
levdatum = symtab_search(&p->p_levels,
sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, l->sens - 1));
if (!levdatum)
return 0;
SELinux: Reduce overhead of mls_level_isvalid() function call While running the high_systime workload of the AIM7 benchmark on a 2-socket 12-core Westmere x86-64 machine running 3.10-rc4 kernel (with HT on), it was found that a pretty sizable amount of time was spent in the SELinux code. Below was the perf trace of the "perf record -a -s" of a test run at 1500 users: 5.04% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ebitmap_get_bit 1.96% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] mls_level_isvalid 1.95% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] find_next_bit The ebitmap_get_bit() was the hottest function in the perf-report output. Both the ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions were, in fact, called by mls_level_isvalid(). As a result, the mls_level_isvalid() call consumed 8.95% of the total CPU time of all the 24 virtual CPUs which is quite a lot. The majority of the mls_level_isvalid() function invocations come from the socket creation system call. Looking at the mls_level_isvalid() function, it is checking to see if all the bits set in one of the ebitmap structure are also set in another one as well as the highest set bit is no bigger than the one specified by the given policydb data structure. It is doing it in a bit-by-bit manner. So if the ebitmap structure has many bits set, the iteration loop will be done many times. The current code can be rewritten to use a similar algorithm as the ebitmap_contains() function with an additional check for the highest set bit. The ebitmap_contains() function was extended to cover an optional additional check for the highest set bit, and the mls_level_isvalid() function was modified to call ebitmap_contains(). With that change, the perf trace showed that the used CPU time drop down to just 0.08% (ebitmap_contains + mls_level_isvalid) of the total which is about 100X less than before. 0.07% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ebitmap_contains 0.05% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ebitmap_get_bit 0.01% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] mls_level_isvalid 0.01% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] find_next_bit The remaining ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions calls are made by other kernel routines as the new mls_level_isvalid() function will not call them anymore. This patch also improves the high_systime AIM7 benchmark result, though the improvement is not as impressive as is suggested by the reduction in CPU time spent in the ebitmap functions. The table below shows the performance change on the 2-socket x86-64 system (with HT on) mentioned above. +--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+ | Workload | mean % change | mean % change | mean % change | | | 10-100 users | 200-1000 users | 1100-2000 users | +--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+ | high_systime | +0.1% | +0.9% | +2.6% | +--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+ Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-07-24 05:38:41 +08:00
/*
* Return 1 iff all the bits set in l->cat are also be set in
* levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
* p->p_cats.nprim.
*/
return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat,
p->p_cats.nprim);
}
int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r)
{
return (mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[0]) &&
mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[1]) &&
mls_level_dom(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]));
}
/*
* Return 1 if the MLS fields in the security context
* structure `c' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
*/
int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
{
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 1;
if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, &c->range))
return 0;
if (c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL)
return 1;
/*
* User must be authorized for the MLS range.
*/
if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
return 0;
usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
if (!mls_range_contains(usrdatum->range, c->range))
return 0; /* user may not be associated with range */
return 1;
}
/*
* Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
* `context' based on the string representation in
* the string `scontext'.
*
* This function modifies the string in place, inserting
* NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
*
* If a def_sid is provided and no MLS field is present,
* copy the MLS field of the associated default context.
* Used for upgraded to MLS systems where objects may lack
* MLS fields.
*
* Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup.
*
*/
selinux: support deferred mapping of contexts Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this support to save the context information in the SID table and later recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context again. This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy. With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to specific program domains such as the package manager. # rmdir baz # rm bar # touch bar # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # cat setundefined.te policy_module(setundefined, 1.0) require { type unconfined_t; type unlabeled_t; } files_type(unlabeled_t) allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin; # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp # semodule -i setundefined.pp # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # cat foo.te policy_module(foo, 1.0) type foo_exec_t; files_type(foo_exec_t) # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp # semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r foo # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # semodule -i foo.pp # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r setundefined foo # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # rmdir baz # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-05-08 01:03:20 +08:00
int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
char oldc,
char *scontext,
struct context *context,
struct sidtab *s,
u32 def_sid)
{
char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr;
struct level_datum *levdatum;
struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
int l, rc, i;
char *rangep[2];
if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
/*
* With no MLS, only return -EINVAL if there is a MLS field
* and it did not come from an xattr.
*/
if (oldc && def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/*
* No MLS component to the security context, try and map to
* default if provided.
*/
if (!oldc) {
struct context *defcon;
if (def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
defcon = sidtab_search(s, def_sid);
if (!defcon)
return -EINVAL;
return mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
}
/*
* If we're dealing with a range, figure out where the two parts
* of the range begin.
*/
rangep[0] = scontext;
rangep[1] = strchr(scontext, '-');
if (rangep[1]) {
rangep[1][0] = '\0';
rangep[1]++;
}
/* For each part of the range: */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
/* Split sensitivity and category set. */
sensitivity = rangep[l];
if (sensitivity == NULL)
break;
next_cat = strchr(sensitivity, ':');
if (next_cat)
*(next_cat++) = '\0';
/* Parse sensitivity. */
levdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_levels, sensitivity);
if (!levdatum)
return -EINVAL;
context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
/* Extract category set. */
while (next_cat != NULL) {
cur_cat = next_cat;
next_cat = strchr(next_cat, ',');
if (next_cat != NULL)
*(next_cat++) = '\0';
/* Separate into range if exists */
rngptr = strchr(cur_cat, '.');
if (rngptr != NULL) {
/* Remove '.' */
*rngptr++ = '\0';
}
catdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_cats, cur_cat);
if (!catdatum)
return -EINVAL;
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
catdatum->value - 1, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* If range, set all categories in range */
if (rngptr == NULL)
continue;
rngdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_cats, rngptr);
if (!rngdatum)
return -EINVAL;
if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
}
}
/* If we didn't see a '-', the range start is also the range end. */
if (rangep[1] == NULL) {
context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
&context->range.level[0].cat);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
* `context' based on the string representation in
* the string `str'. This function will allocate temporary memory with the
* given constraints of gfp_mask.
*/
int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
char *tmpstr;
int rc;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
tmpstr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
if (!tmpstr) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
} else {
rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', tmpstr, context,
NULL, SECSID_NULL);
kfree(tmpstr);
}
return rc;
}
/*
* Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
*/
int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
struct mls_range *range)
{
int l, rc = 0;
/* Copy the MLS range into the context */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
context->range.level[l].sens = range->level[l].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[l].cat,
&range->level[l].cat);
if (rc)
break;
}
return rc;
}
int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
struct context *usercon)
{
if (p->mls_enabled) {
struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]);
struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel);
struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]);
struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
/* Honor the user's default level if we can */
if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr))
*usercon_sen = *user_def;
else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr))
*usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def))
*usercon_sen = *user_low;
else
return -EINVAL;
/* Lower the clearance of available contexts
if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than
that of the user's default clearance (but
only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
the user's computed sensitivity level) */
if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr))
*usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr))
*usercon_clr = *user_clr;
else
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Convert the MLS fields in the security context
selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM. Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the following reproducer: while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done & for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break # or: # chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break done This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during policy reload, thus solving the above problem. The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages: 1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups) and can still be done safely without locking. 2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a new entry are now about twice as fast. 3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion. The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about 4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32 entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway... The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for kmalloc() to handle. Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries. The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its effectivity, not the correctness of lookups. Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple stress test: ``` function rand_cat() { echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 )) } function do_work() { while true; do echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \ >/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true done } do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done kill %1 kill %2 kill %3 ``` Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38 Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com> Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts] [PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-30 23:24:08 +08:00
* structure `oldc' from the values specified in the
* policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp',
* storing the resulting context in `newc'.
*/
int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
struct policydb *newp,
selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM. Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the following reproducer: while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done & for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break # or: # chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break done This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during policy reload, thus solving the above problem. The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages: 1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups) and can still be done safely without locking. 2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a new entry are now about twice as fast. 3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion. The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about 4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32 entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway... The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for kmalloc() to handle. Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries. The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its effectivity, not the correctness of lookups. Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple stress test: ``` function rand_cat() { echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 )) } function do_work() { while true; do echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \ >/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true done } do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done kill %1 kill %2 kill %3 ``` Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38 Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com> Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts] [PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-30 23:24:08 +08:00
struct context *oldc,
struct context *newc)
{
struct level_datum *levdatum;
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
int l, i;
if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
return 0;
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
char *name = sym_name(oldp, SYM_LEVELS,
oldc->range.level[l].sens - 1);
levdatum = symtab_search(&newp->p_levels, name);
if (!levdatum)
return -EINVAL;
selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM. Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the following reproducer: while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done & for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break # or: # chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break done This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during policy reload, thus solving the above problem. The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages: 1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups) and can still be done safely without locking. 2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a new entry are now about twice as fast. 3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion. The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about 4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32 entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway... The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for kmalloc() to handle. Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries. The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its effectivity, not the correctness of lookups. Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple stress test: ``` function rand_cat() { echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 )) } function do_work() { while true; do echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \ >/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true done } do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done kill %1 kill %2 kill %3 ``` Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38 Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com> Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts] [PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-30 23:24:08 +08:00
newc->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM. Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the following reproducer: while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done & for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break # or: # chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break done This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during policy reload, thus solving the above problem. The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages: 1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups) and can still be done safely without locking. 2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a new entry are now about twice as fast. 3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion. The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about 4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32 entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway... The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for kmalloc() to handle. Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries. The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its effectivity, not the correctness of lookups. Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple stress test: ``` function rand_cat() { echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 )) } function do_work() { while true; do echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \ >/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true done } do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done kill %1 kill %2 kill %3 ``` Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38 Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com> Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts] [PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-30 23:24:08 +08:00
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&oldc->range.level[l].cat,
node, i) {
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
int rc;
catdatum = symtab_search(&newp->p_cats,
sym_name(oldp, SYM_CATS, i));
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
if (!catdatum)
return -EINVAL;
selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM. Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the following reproducer: while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done & for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break # or: # chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break done This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during policy reload, thus solving the above problem. The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages: 1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups) and can still be done safely without locking. 2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a new entry are now about twice as fast. 3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion. The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about 4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32 entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway... The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for kmalloc() to handle. Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries. The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its effectivity, not the correctness of lookups. Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple stress test: ``` function rand_cat() { echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 )) } function do_work() { while true; do echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \ >/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true done } do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done kill %1 kill %2 kill %3 ``` Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38 Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com> Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts] [PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-30 23:24:08 +08:00
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&newc->range.level[l].cat,
catdatum->value - 1, 1);
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses. * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-29 01:20:55 +08:00
if (rc)
return rc;
}
}
return 0;
}
int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
struct context *scontext,
struct context *tcontext,
u16 tclass,
u32 specified,
struct context *newcontext,
bool sock)
{
struct range_trans rtr;
struct mls_range *r;
SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-03-21 02:35:12 +08:00
struct class_datum *cladatum;
int default_range = 0;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 0;
switch (specified) {
case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
/* Look for a range transition rule. */
rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
rtr.target_class = tclass;
2020-07-10 03:19:51 +08:00
r = policydb_rangetr_search(p, &rtr);
if (r)
return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-03-21 02:35:12 +08:00
if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) {
cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-03-21 02:35:12 +08:00
if (cladatum)
default_range = cladatum->default_range;
}
switch (default_range) {
case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext);
case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext);
case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
return mls_context_glblub(newcontext,
scontext, tcontext);
SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-03-21 02:35:12 +08:00
}
fallthrough;
case AVTAB_CHANGE:
if ((tclass == p->process_class) || sock)
/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
else
/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
case AVTAB_MEMBER:
/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/**
* mls_export_netlbl_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels to NetLabel
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
* Description:
* Given the security context copy the low MLS sensitivity level into the
* NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
*
*/
void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return;
secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
}
/**
* mls_import_netlbl_lvl - Import the NetLabel MLS sensitivity levels
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
* Description:
* Given the security context and the NetLabel security attributes, copy the
* NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
*
*/
void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return;
context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
}
/**
* mls_export_netlbl_cat - Export the MLS categories to NetLabel
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
* Description:
* Given the security context copy the low MLS categories into the NetLabel
* MLS category field. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
int rc;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 0;
rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
&secattr->attr.mls.cat);
if (rc == 0 && secattr->attr.mls.cat != NULL)
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
return rc;
}
/**
* mls_import_netlbl_cat - Import the MLS categories from NetLabel
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
* Description:
* Copy the NetLabel security attributes into the SELinux context; since the
* NetLabel security attribute only contains a single MLS category use it for
* both the low and high categories of the context. Returns zero on success,
* negative values on failure.
*
*/
int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
int rc;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 0;
rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
secattr->attr.mls.cat);
if (rc)
goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
memcpy(&context->range.level[1].cat, &context->range.level[0].cat,
sizeof(context->range.level[0].cat));
return 0;
import_netlbl_cat_failure:
ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat);
return rc;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */