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kernel_optimize_test/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h

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Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */
/*
* Security object class definitions
*/
selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission definitions and userland definitions may change. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-03-27 01:36:26 +08:00
S_(NULL)
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
S_("security")
S_("process")
S_("system")
S_("capability")
S_("filesystem")
S_("file")
S_("dir")
S_("fd")
S_("lnk_file")
S_("chr_file")
S_("blk_file")
S_("sock_file")
S_("fifo_file")
S_("socket")
S_("tcp_socket")
S_("udp_socket")
S_("rawip_socket")
S_("node")
S_("netif")
S_("netlink_socket")
S_("packet_socket")
S_("key_socket")
S_("unix_stream_socket")
S_("unix_dgram_socket")
S_("sem")
S_("msg")
S_("msgq")
S_("shm")
S_("ipc")
selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission definitions and userland definitions may change. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-03-27 01:36:26 +08:00
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
S_("netlink_route_socket")
S_("netlink_firewall_socket")
S_("netlink_tcpdiag_socket")
S_("netlink_nflog_socket")
S_("netlink_xfrm_socket")
S_("netlink_selinux_socket")
S_("netlink_audit_socket")
S_("netlink_ip6fw_socket")
S_("netlink_dnrt_socket")
selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission definitions and userland definitions may change. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-03-27 01:36:26 +08:00
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
[PATCH] SELinux: add support for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket class. Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-17 06:24:13 +08:00
S_("association")
S_("netlink_kobject_uevent_socket")
[SELINUX]: add security class for appletalk sockets Add a security class for appletalk sockets so that they can be distinguished in SELinux policy. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 15:25:03 +08:00
S_("appletalk_socket")
[SECMARK]: Add new flask definitions to SELinux Secmark implements a new scheme for adding security markings to packets via iptables, as well as changes to SELinux to use these markings for security policy enforcement. The rationale for this scheme is explained and discussed in detail in the original threads: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/34927/ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/35244/ Examples of policy and rulesets, as well as a full archive of patches for iptables and SELinux userland, may be found at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/secmark/ The code has been tested with various compilation options and in several scenarios, including with 'complicated' protocols such as FTP and also with the new generic conntrack code with IPv6 connection tracking. This patch: Add support for a new object class ('packet'), and associated permissions ('send', 'recv', 'relabelto'). These are used to enforce security policy for network packets labeled with SECMARK, and for adding labeling rules. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 15:27:28 +08:00
S_("packet")
[PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystem Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings within the SELinux initialization routine. Has passed David's testsuite. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 05:47:17 +08:00
S_("key")
selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission definitions and userland definitions may change. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-03-27 01:36:26 +08:00
S_(NULL)
[SELinux]: Add support for DCCP This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP (http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers. The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of TCP. A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol differentation. The permissions for this class inherit all of the socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind, name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled networking is not, at this stage. Patches for SELinux userspace are at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/ I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as expected. Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real difference being that it's a different protocol. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-14 08:09:01 +08:00
S_("dccp_socket")
security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting to mmap to low area of the address space. The amount of space protected is indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to 0, preserving existing behavior. This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect." Policy already contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea) Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-06-29 03:55:21 +08:00
S_("memprotect")
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