forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
fbdev/omapfb: fix omapfb_memory_read infoleak
OMAPFB_MEMORY_READ ioctl reads pixels from the LCD's memory and copies them to a userspace buffer. The code has two issues: - The user provided width and height could be large enough to overflow the calculations - The copy_to_user() can copy uninitialized memory to the userspace, which might contain sensitive kernel information. Fix these by limiting the width & height parameters, and only copying the amount of data that we actually received from the LCD. Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: security@kernel.org Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
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@ -496,6 +496,9 @@ static int omapfb_memory_read(struct fb_info *fbi,
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if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, mr->buffer, mr->buffer_size))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (mr->w > 4096 || mr->h > 4096)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (mr->w * mr->h * 3 > mr->buffer_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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@ -509,7 +512,7 @@ static int omapfb_memory_read(struct fb_info *fbi,
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mr->x, mr->y, mr->w, mr->h);
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if (r > 0) {
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if (copy_to_user(mr->buffer, buf, mr->buffer_size))
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if (copy_to_user(mr->buffer, buf, r))
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r = -EFAULT;
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}
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