forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1
pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'zatm_dev->pool_info' (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index zatm_dev->pool_info Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
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#include <asm/io.h>
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#include <linux/atomic.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include "uPD98401.h"
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#include "uPD98402.h"
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@ -1458,6 +1459,8 @@ static int zatm_ioctl(struct atm_dev *dev,unsigned int cmd,void __user *arg)
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return -EFAULT;
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if (pool < 0 || pool > ZATM_LAST_POOL)
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return -EINVAL;
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pool = array_index_nospec(pool,
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ZATM_LAST_POOL + 1);
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spin_lock_irqsave(&zatm_dev->lock, flags);
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info = zatm_dev->pool_info[pool];
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if (cmd == ZATM_GETPOOLZ) {
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