forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
do_exit(): make sure that we run with get_fs() == USER_DS
If a user manages to trigger an oops with fs set to KERNEL_DS, fs is not otherwise reset before do_exit(). do_exit may later (via mm_release in fork.c) do a put_user to a user-controlled address, potentially allowing a user to leverage an oops into a controlled write into kernel memory. This is only triggerable in the presence of another bug, but this potentially turns a lot of DoS bugs into privilege escalations, so it's worth fixing. I have proof-of-concept code which uses this bug along with CVE-2010-3849 to write a zero to an arbitrary kernel address, so I've tested that this is not theoretical. A more logical place to put this fix might be when we know an oops has occurred, before we call do_exit(), but that would involve changing every architecture, in multiple places. Let's just stick it in do_exit instead. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: update code comment] Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -914,6 +914,15 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
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if (unlikely(!tsk->pid))
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panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!");
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/*
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* If do_exit is called because this processes oopsed, it's possible
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* that get_fs() was left as KERNEL_DS, so reset it to USER_DS before
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* continuing. Amongst other possible reasons, this is to prevent
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* mm_release()->clear_child_tid() from writing to a user-controlled
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* kernel address.
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*/
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set_fs(USER_DS);
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tracehook_report_exit(&code);
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validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
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