forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
nfs4: fix channel attribute sanity-checks
The sanity checks here are incorrect; in the worst case they allow values that crash the client. They're also over-reliant on the preprocessor. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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1c787096fc
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@ -4842,49 +4842,56 @@ static void nfs4_init_channel_attrs(struct nfs41_create_session_args *args)
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args->bc_attrs.max_reqs);
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}
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static int _verify_channel_attr(char *chan, char *attr_name, u32 sent, u32 rcvd)
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static int nfs4_verify_fore_channel_attrs(struct nfs41_create_session_args *args, struct nfs4_session *session)
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{
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if (rcvd <= sent)
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return 0;
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printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Session INVALID: %s channel %s increased. "
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"sent=%u rcvd=%u\n", __func__, chan, attr_name, sent, rcvd);
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return -EINVAL;
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struct nfs4_channel_attrs *sent = &args->fc_attrs;
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struct nfs4_channel_attrs *rcvd = &session->fc_attrs;
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if (rcvd->headerpadsz > sent->headerpadsz)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (rcvd->max_resp_sz > sent->max_resp_sz)
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* Our requested max_ops is the minimum we need; we're not
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* prepared to break up compounds into smaller pieces than that.
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* So, no point even trying to continue if the server won't
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* cooperate:
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*/
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if (rcvd->max_ops < sent->max_ops)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (rcvd->max_reqs == 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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#define _verify_fore_channel_attr(_name_) \
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_verify_channel_attr("fore", #_name_, \
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args->fc_attrs._name_, \
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session->fc_attrs._name_)
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static int nfs4_verify_back_channel_attrs(struct nfs41_create_session_args *args, struct nfs4_session *session)
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{
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struct nfs4_channel_attrs *sent = &args->bc_attrs;
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struct nfs4_channel_attrs *rcvd = &session->bc_attrs;
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#define _verify_back_channel_attr(_name_) \
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_verify_channel_attr("back", #_name_, \
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args->bc_attrs._name_, \
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session->bc_attrs._name_)
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if (rcvd->max_rqst_sz > sent->max_rqst_sz)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (rcvd->max_resp_sz < sent->max_resp_sz)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (rcvd->max_resp_sz_cached > sent->max_resp_sz_cached)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* These would render the backchannel useless: */
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if (rcvd->max_ops == 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (rcvd->max_reqs == 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* The server is not allowed to increase the fore channel header pad size,
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* maximum response size, or maximum number of operations.
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*
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* The back channel attributes are only negotiatied down: We send what the
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* (back channel) server insists upon.
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*/
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static int nfs4_verify_channel_attrs(struct nfs41_create_session_args *args,
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struct nfs4_session *session)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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int ret;
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ret |= _verify_fore_channel_attr(headerpadsz);
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ret |= _verify_fore_channel_attr(max_resp_sz);
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ret |= _verify_fore_channel_attr(max_ops);
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ret |= _verify_back_channel_attr(headerpadsz);
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ret |= _verify_back_channel_attr(max_rqst_sz);
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ret |= _verify_back_channel_attr(max_resp_sz);
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ret |= _verify_back_channel_attr(max_resp_sz_cached);
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ret |= _verify_back_channel_attr(max_ops);
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ret |= _verify_back_channel_attr(max_reqs);
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return ret;
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ret = nfs4_verify_fore_channel_attrs(args, session);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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return nfs4_verify_back_channel_attrs(args, session);
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}
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static int _nfs4_proc_create_session(struct nfs_client *clp)
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