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perf/core: Take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON capability

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Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only
privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check
in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify
user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing
attack surface.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/7776fa40-6c65-2aa6-1322-eb3a01201000@linux.intel.com/

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6e8392ff-4732-0012-2949-e1587709f0f6@linux.intel.com
This commit is contained in:
Alexey Budankov 2020-08-05 10:56:56 +03:00 committed by Ingo Molnar
parent 2324d50d05
commit 45fd22da97
1 changed files with 2 additions and 2 deletions
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4
kernel/events/core.c
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@ -11689,7 +11689,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
goto err_task;
/*
* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
* Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
*
* We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
* perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
@ -11697,7 +11697,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
*/
err = -EACCES;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_cred;
}