From 601f0093f2647db67be40b62e13cd0660990a7c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2019 16:04:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1/8] KEYS: remove CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT KEYS_COMPAT now always takes the value of COMPAT && KEYS. But the security/keys/ directory is only compiled if KEYS is enabled, so in practice KEYS_COMPAT is the same as COMPAT. Therefore, remove the unnecessary KEYS_COMPAT and just use COMPAT directly. (Also remove an outdated comment from compat.c.) Reviewed-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/keys/Kconfig | 4 ---- security/keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/compat.c | 5 ----- security/keys/internal.h | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index dd313438fecf..47c041563d41 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -21,10 +21,6 @@ config KEYS If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. -config KEYS_COMPAT - def_bool y - depends on COMPAT && KEYS - config KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE bool "Enable temporary caching of the last request_key() result" depends on KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 074f27538f55..5f40807f05b3 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ obj-y := \ request_key_auth.o \ user_defined.o compat-obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += compat_dh.o -obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o $(compat-obj-y) +obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o $(compat-obj-y) obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c index 9bcc404131aa..b975f8f11124 100644 --- a/security/keys/compat.c +++ b/security/keys/compat.c @@ -46,11 +46,6 @@ static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( /* * The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs - * - * This should only be called if the 64-bit arch uses weird pointers in 32-bit - * mode or doesn't guarantee that the top 32-bits of the argument registers on - * taking a 32-bit syscall are zero. If you can, you should call sys_keyctl() - * directly. */ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option, u32, arg2, u32, arg3, u32, arg4, u32, arg5) diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index c039373488bd..ba3e2da14cef 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ extern long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *, size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *); extern long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *, size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params *); -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT extern long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf); @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static inline long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT static inline long compat_keyctl_dh_compute( struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, From bea37414453eb08d4ceffeb60a9d490dbc930cea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2019 16:03:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/8] KEYS: asymmetric: return ENOMEM if akcipher_request_alloc() fails No error code was being set on this error path. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ad4b1eb5fb33 ("KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation [ver #2]") Fixes: c08fed737126 ("KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric key [ver #2]") Reviewed-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 1 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index d16d893bd195..378b18b9bc34 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ static int tpm_key_encrypt(struct tpm_key *tk, if (ret < 0) goto error_free_tfm; + ret = -ENOMEM; req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); if (!req) goto error_free_tfm; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index 364b9df9d631..d7f43d4ea925 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); + ret = -ENOMEM; req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); if (!req) goto error_free_tfm; From 21df4a8b6018b842d4db181a8b24166006bad3cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Snitselaar Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 16:54:55 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 3/8] tpm_tis: reserve chip for duration of tpm_tis_core_init Instead of repeatedly calling tpm_chip_start/tpm_chip_stop when issuing commands to the tpm during initialization, just reserve the chip after wait_startup, and release it when we are ready to call tpm_chip_register. Cc: Christian Bundy Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Peter Huewe Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Stefan Berger Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a3fbfae82b4c ("tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit()") Fixes: 5b359c7c4372 ("tpm_tis_core: Turn on the TPM before probing IRQ's") Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c index 8af2cee1a762..bb0343ffd235 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c @@ -978,13 +978,13 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_tis_data *priv, int irq, if (wait_startup(chip, 0) != 0) { rc = -ENODEV; - goto out_err; + goto err_start; } /* Take control of the TPM's interrupt hardware and shut it off */ rc = tpm_tis_read32(priv, TPM_INT_ENABLE(priv->locality), &intmask); if (rc < 0) - goto out_err; + goto err_start; intmask |= TPM_INTF_CMD_READY_INT | TPM_INTF_LOCALITY_CHANGE_INT | TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT | TPM_INTF_STS_VALID_INT; @@ -993,21 +993,21 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_tis_data *priv, int irq, rc = tpm_chip_start(chip); if (rc) - goto out_err; + goto err_start; + rc = tpm2_probe(chip); - tpm_chip_stop(chip); if (rc) - goto out_err; + goto err_probe; rc = tpm_tis_read32(priv, TPM_DID_VID(0), &vendor); if (rc < 0) - goto out_err; + goto err_probe; priv->manufacturer_id = vendor; rc = tpm_tis_read8(priv, TPM_RID(0), &rid); if (rc < 0) - goto out_err; + goto err_probe; dev_info(dev, "%s TPM (device-id 0x%X, rev-id %d)\n", (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) ? "2.0" : "1.2", @@ -1016,13 +1016,13 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_tis_data *priv, int irq, probe = probe_itpm(chip); if (probe < 0) { rc = -ENODEV; - goto out_err; + goto err_probe; } /* Figure out the capabilities */ rc = tpm_tis_read32(priv, TPM_INTF_CAPS(priv->locality), &intfcaps); if (rc < 0) - goto out_err; + goto err_probe; dev_dbg(dev, "TPM interface capabilities (0x%x):\n", intfcaps); @@ -1056,10 +1056,9 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_tis_data *priv, int irq, if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) { dev_err(dev, "Could not get TPM timeouts and durations\n"); rc = -ENODEV; - goto out_err; + goto err_probe; } - tpm_chip_start(chip); chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ; if (irq) { tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, IRQF_SHARED, @@ -1070,18 +1069,20 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_tis_data *priv, int irq, } else { tpm_tis_probe_irq(chip, intmask); } - tpm_chip_stop(chip); } + tpm_chip_stop(chip); + rc = tpm_chip_register(chip); if (rc) - goto out_err; - - if (chip->ops->clk_enable != NULL) - chip->ops->clk_enable(chip, false); + goto err_start; return 0; -out_err: + +err_probe: + tpm_chip_stop(chip); + +err_start: if ((chip->ops != NULL) && (chip->ops->clk_enable != NULL)) chip->ops->clk_enable(chip, false); From 45477b3fe3d10376b649b1b85fce72b2f9f1da84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Bottomley Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 12:58:35 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 4/8] security: keys: trusted: fix lost handle flush The original code, before it was moved into security/keys/trusted-keys had a flush after the blob unseal. Without that flush, the volatile handles increase in the TPM until it becomes unusable and the system either has to be rebooted or the TPM volatile area manually flushed. Fix by adding back the lost flush, which we now have to export because of the relocation of the trusted key code may cause the consumer to be modular. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 1 - drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 1 + include/linux/tpm.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index b9e1547be6b5..5620747da0cf 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -218,7 +218,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digests); int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max); -void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id, u32 *value, const char *desc); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index fdb457704aa7..13696deceae8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle) tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "flushing context"); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_flush_context); struct tpm2_get_cap_out { u8 more_data; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 0d6e949ba315..03e9b184411b 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, extern int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen); extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max); extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void); +void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); #else static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index a9810ac2776f..08ec7f48f01d 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle); return rc; } From d23d12484307b40eea549b8a858f5fffad913897 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tadeusz Struk Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 09:48:47 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 5/8] tpm: fix invalid locking in NONBLOCKING mode When an application sends TPM commands in NONBLOCKING mode the driver holds chip->tpm_mutex returning from write(), which triggers: "WARNING: lock held when returning to user space". To fix this issue the driver needs to release the mutex before returning and acquire it again in tpm_dev_async_work() before sending the command. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9e1b74a63f776 (tpm: add support for nonblocking operation) Reported-by: Jeffrin Jose T Tested-by: Jeffrin Jose T Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c index 2ec47a69a2a6..b23b0b999232 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ static void tpm_dev_async_work(struct work_struct *work) mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex); priv->command_enqueued = false; + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(priv->chip); + if (ret) { + priv->response_length = ret; + goto out; + } + ret = tpm_dev_transmit(priv->chip, priv->space, priv->data_buffer, sizeof(priv->data_buffer)); tpm_put_ops(priv->chip); @@ -68,6 +74,7 @@ static void tpm_dev_async_work(struct work_struct *work) priv->response_length = ret; mod_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, jiffies + (120 * HZ)); } +out: mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex); wake_up_interruptible(&priv->async_wait); } @@ -204,6 +211,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) { priv->command_enqueued = true; queue_work(tpm_dev_wq, &priv->async_work); + tpm_put_ops(priv->chip); mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex); return size; } From 8f84bddcfac9117564721ead494db7a604fdf861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tadeusz Struk Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 09:48:53 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 6/8] tpm: selftest: add test covering async mode Add a test that sends a tpm cmd in an async mode. Currently there is a gap in test coverage with regards to this functionality. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2.py | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py | 13 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh index 80521d46220c..cb54ab637ea6 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh @@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) python -m unittest -v tpm2_tests.SmokeTest +python -m unittest -v tpm2_tests.AsyncTest diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2.py b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2.py index 828c18584624..d0fcb66a88a6 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2.py +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2.py @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import socket import struct import sys import unittest -from fcntl import ioctl - +import fcntl +import select TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS = 0x8001 TPM2_ST_SESSIONS = 0x8002 @@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ def hex_dump(d): class Client: FLAG_DEBUG = 0x01 FLAG_SPACE = 0x02 + FLAG_NONBLOCK = 0x04 TPM_IOC_NEW_SPACE = 0xa200 def __init__(self, flags = 0): @@ -362,13 +363,27 @@ class Client: else: self.tpm = open('/dev/tpmrm0', 'r+b', buffering=0) + if (self.flags & Client.FLAG_NONBLOCK): + flags = fcntl.fcntl(self.tpm, fcntl.F_GETFL) + flags |= os.O_NONBLOCK + fcntl.fcntl(self.tpm, fcntl.F_SETFL, flags) + self.tpm_poll = select.poll() + def close(self): self.tpm.close() def send_cmd(self, cmd): self.tpm.write(cmd) + + if (self.flags & Client.FLAG_NONBLOCK): + self.tpm_poll.register(self.tpm, select.POLLIN) + self.tpm_poll.poll(10000) + rsp = self.tpm.read() + if (self.flags & Client.FLAG_NONBLOCK): + self.tpm_poll.unregister(self.tpm) + if (self.flags & Client.FLAG_DEBUG) != 0: sys.stderr.write('cmd' + os.linesep) sys.stderr.write(hex_dump(cmd) + os.linesep) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py index d4973be53493..728be7c69b76 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py @@ -288,3 +288,16 @@ class SpaceTest(unittest.TestCase): self.assertEqual(rc, tpm2.TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE | tpm2.TSS2_RESMGR_TPM_RC_LAYER) + +class AsyncTest(unittest.TestCase): + def setUp(self): + logging.basicConfig(filename='AsyncTest.log', level=logging.DEBUG) + + def test_async(self): + log = logging.getLogger(__name__) + log.debug(sys._getframe().f_code.co_name) + + async_client = tpm2.Client(tpm2.Client.FLAG_NONBLOCK) + log.debug("Calling get_cap in a NON_BLOCKING mode") + async_client.get_cap(tpm2.TPM2_CAP_HANDLES, tpm2.HR_LOADED_SESSION) + async_client.close() From a9920d3bad40201ee8ab1da36bee4674f7e50d69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tadeusz Struk Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 09:48:59 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 7/8] tpm: selftest: cleanup after unseal with wrong auth/policy test Unseal with wrong auth or wrong policy test affects DA lockout and eventually causes the tests to fail with: "ProtocolError: TPM_RC_LOCKOUT: rc=0x00000921" when the tests run multiple times. Send tpm clear command after the test to reset the DA counters. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh index cb54ab637ea6..8155c2ea7ccb 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/test_smoke.sh @@ -3,3 +3,8 @@ python -m unittest -v tpm2_tests.SmokeTest python -m unittest -v tpm2_tests.AsyncTest + +CLEAR_CMD=$(which tpm2_clear) +if [ -n $CLEAR_CMD ]; then + tpm2_clear -T device +fi From 1760eb689ed68c6746744aff2092bff57c78d907 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Tatashin Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 10:40:38 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 8/8] tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: add shutdown call back Add shutdown call back to close existing session with fTPM TA to support kexec scenario. Add parentheses to function names in comments as specified in kdoc. Signed-off-by: Thirupathaiah Annapureddy Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c index 6640a14dbe48..22bf553ccf9d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static const uuid_t ftpm_ta_uuid = 0x82, 0xCB, 0x34, 0x3F, 0xB7, 0xF3, 0x78, 0x96); /** - * ftpm_tee_tpm_op_recv - retrieve fTPM response. + * ftpm_tee_tpm_op_recv() - retrieve fTPM response. * @chip: the tpm_chip description as specified in driver/char/tpm/tpm.h. * @buf: the buffer to store data. * @count: the number of bytes to read. @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static int ftpm_tee_tpm_op_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count) } /** - * ftpm_tee_tpm_op_send - send TPM commands through the TEE shared memory. + * ftpm_tee_tpm_op_send() - send TPM commands through the TEE shared memory. * @chip: the tpm_chip description as specified in driver/char/tpm/tpm.h * @buf: the buffer to send. * @len: the number of bytes to send. @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int ftpm_tee_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) } /** - * ftpm_tee_probe - initialize the fTPM + * ftpm_tee_probe() - initialize the fTPM * @pdev: the platform_device description. * * Return: @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ static int ftpm_tee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } /** - * ftpm_tee_remove - remove the TPM device + * ftpm_tee_remove() - remove the TPM device * @pdev: the platform_device description. * * Return: @@ -328,6 +328,19 @@ static int ftpm_tee_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; } +/** + * ftpm_tee_shutdown() - shutdown the TPM device + * @pdev: the platform_device description. + */ +static void ftpm_tee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct ftpm_tee_private *pvt_data = dev_get_drvdata(&pdev->dev); + + tee_shm_free(pvt_data->shm); + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data->ctx, pvt_data->session); + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data->ctx); +} + static const struct of_device_id of_ftpm_tee_ids[] = { { .compatible = "microsoft,ftpm" }, { } @@ -341,6 +354,7 @@ static struct platform_driver ftpm_tee_driver = { }, .probe = ftpm_tee_probe, .remove = ftpm_tee_remove, + .shutdown = ftpm_tee_shutdown, }; module_platform_driver(ftpm_tee_driver);