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vsprintf: refactor %pK code out of pointer()

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Currently code to handle %pK is all within the switch statement in
pointer(). This is the wrong level of abstraction. Each of the other switch
clauses call a helper function, pK should do the same.

Refactor code out of pointer() to new function restricted_pointer().

Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
This commit is contained in:
Tobin C. Harding 2017-11-23 10:56:39 +11:00
parent 553d8e8b10
commit 57e734423a
1 changed files with 54 additions and 43 deletions
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97
lib/vsprintf.c
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@ -1343,6 +1343,59 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
return string(buf, end, uuid, spec);
}
int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
static noinline_for_stack
char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
struct printf_spec spec)
{
spec.base = 16;
spec.flags |= SMALL;
if (spec.field_width == -1) {
spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
}
switch (kptr_restrict) {
case 0:
/* Always print %pK values */
break;
case 1: {
const struct cred *cred;
/*
* kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
* because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
*/
if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi())
return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
/*
* Only print the real pointer value if the current
* process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
* same credentials it started with. This is because
* access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
* checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
* leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
* %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
*/
cred = current_cred();
if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
!gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
ptr = NULL;
break;
}
case 2:
default:
/* Always print 0's for %pK */
ptr = NULL;
break;
}
return number(buf, end, (unsigned long)ptr, spec);
}
static noinline_for_stack
char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr, const char *fmt)
{
@ -1591,8 +1644,6 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
}
int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
/*
* Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed
* by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format
@ -1792,47 +1843,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
return buf;
}
case 'K':
switch (kptr_restrict) {
case 0:
/* Always print %pK values */
break;
case 1: {
const struct cred *cred;
/*
* kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
* because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
*/
if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
if (spec.field_width == -1)
spec.field_width = default_width;
return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
}
/*
* Only print the real pointer value if the current
* process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
* same credentials it started with. This is because
* access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
* checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
* leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
* %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
*/
cred = current_cred();
if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
!gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
ptr = NULL;
break;
}
case 2:
default:
/* Always print 0's for %pK */
ptr = NULL;
break;
}
break;
return restricted_pointer(buf, end, ptr, spec);
case 'N':
return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, fmt);
case 'a':