forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
eCryptfs: Infinite loop due to overflow in ecryptfs_write()
ecryptfs_write() can enter an infinite loop when truncating a file to a size larger than 4G. This only happens on architectures where size_t is represented by 32 bits. This was caused by a size_t overflow due to it incorrectly being used to store the result of a calculation which uses potentially large values of type loff_t. [tyhicks@canonical.com: rewrite subject and commit message] Signed-off-by: Li Wang <liwang@nudt.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Yunchuan Wen <wenyunchuan@kylinos.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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@ -130,13 +130,13 @@ int ecryptfs_write(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode, char *data, loff_t offset,
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pgoff_t ecryptfs_page_idx = (pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT);
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size_t start_offset_in_page = (pos & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK);
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size_t num_bytes = (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - start_offset_in_page);
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size_t total_remaining_bytes = ((offset + size) - pos);
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loff_t total_remaining_bytes = ((offset + size) - pos);
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if (num_bytes > total_remaining_bytes)
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num_bytes = total_remaining_bytes;
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if (pos < offset) {
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/* remaining zeros to write, up to destination offset */
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size_t total_remaining_zeros = (offset - pos);
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loff_t total_remaining_zeros = (offset - pos);
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if (num_bytes > total_remaining_zeros)
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num_bytes = total_remaining_zeros;
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