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vt: fix unchecked __put_user() in tioclinux ioctls

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Only read access is checked before this call.

Actually, at the moment this is not an issue, as every in-tree arch does
the same manual checks for VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE, relying on the MMU
to tell them apart, but this wasn't the case in the past and may happen
again on some odd arch in the future.

If anyone cares about 3.7 and earlier, this is a security hole (untested)
on real 80386 CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.7-
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Adam Borowski 2017-06-03 09:35:06 +02:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent cc1e66f92b
commit 6987dc8a70
1 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions
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6
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
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@ -2709,13 +2709,13 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)
* related to the kernel should not use this.
*/
data = vt_get_shift_state();
ret = __put_user(data, p);
ret = put_user(data, p);
break;
case TIOCL_GETMOUSEREPORTING:
console_lock(); /* May be overkill */
data = mouse_reporting();
console_unlock();
ret = __put_user(data, p);
ret = put_user(data, p);
break;
case TIOCL_SETVESABLANK:
console_lock();
@ -2724,7 +2724,7 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)
break;
case TIOCL_GETKMSGREDIRECT:
data = vt_get_kmsg_redirect();
ret = __put_user(data, p);
ret = put_user(data, p);
break;
case TIOCL_SETKMSGREDIRECT:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {