forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zero
If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at
the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc()
will see a zero refcount. Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and
will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero.
Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to
be freed behind our back.
This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment
atomically.
Fixes: fff292914d
("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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parent
7cbe0932c2
commit
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@ -660,14 +660,11 @@ struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
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goto error;
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found:
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/* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
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if (refcount_read(&key->usage) == 0)
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goto not_found;
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/* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
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* doesn't actually change the key
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/* A key is allowed to be looked up only if someone still owns a
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* reference to it - otherwise it's awaiting the gc.
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*/
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__key_get(key);
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if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&key->usage))
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goto not_found;
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error:
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spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
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