forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn: potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index fsg_opts->common->luns Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -221,6 +221,8 @@
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#include <linux/usb/gadget.h>
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#include <linux/usb/composite.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include "configfs.h"
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@ -3152,6 +3154,7 @@ static struct config_group *fsg_lun_make(struct config_group *group,
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fsg_opts = to_fsg_opts(&group->cg_item);
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if (num >= FSG_MAX_LUNS)
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return ERR_PTR(-ERANGE);
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num = array_index_nospec(num, FSG_MAX_LUNS);
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mutex_lock(&fsg_opts->lock);
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if (fsg_opts->refcnt || fsg_opts->common->luns[num]) {
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