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x86/mm: Always enable CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and remove the Kconfig option

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This removes the CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA option and makes it always enabled.

This simplifies the code and also makes it clearer that read-only mapped
memory is just as fundamental a security feature in kernel-space as it is
in user-space.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455748879-21872-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Kees Cook 2016-02-17 14:41:14 -08:00 committed by Ingo Molnar
parent d2aa1acad2
commit 9ccaf77cf0
13 changed files with 25 additions and 61 deletions
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3
arch/x86/Kconfig
View File

@ -303,6 +303,9 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
def_bool y
config DEBUG_RODATA
def_bool y
config PGTABLE_LEVELS
int
default 4 if X86_64

18
arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
View File

@ -74,28 +74,16 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP
issues with the mapping of the EFI runtime regions into that
table.
config DEBUG_RODATA
bool "Write protect kernel read-only data structures"
default y
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
---help---
Mark the kernel read-only data as write-protected in the pagetables,
in order to catch accidental (and incorrect) writes to such const
data. This is recommended so that we can catch kernel bugs sooner.
If in doubt, say "Y".
config DEBUG_RODATA_TEST
bool "Testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA feature"
depends on DEBUG_RODATA
bool "Testcase for the marking rodata read-only"
default y
---help---
This option enables a testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA
feature as well as for the change_page_attr() infrastructure.
This option enables a testcase for the setting rodata read-only
as well as for the change_page_attr() infrastructure.
If in doubt, say "N"
config DEBUG_WX
bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
depends on DEBUG_RODATA
select X86_PTDUMP_CORE
---help---
Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.

5
arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
View File

@ -91,15 +91,10 @@ void clflush_cache_range(void *addr, unsigned int size);
#define mmio_flush_range(addr, size) clflush_cache_range(addr, size)
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
extern const int rodata_test_data;
extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
#else
static inline void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { }
static inline void set_kernel_text_ro(void) { }
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA_TEST
int rodata_test(void);

7
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
View File

@ -17,15 +17,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#define KVM_HYPERCALL \
ALTERNATIVE(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xc1", ".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd9", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL)
#else
/* On AMD processors, vmcall will generate a trap that we will
* then rewrite to the appropriate instruction.
*/
#define KVM_HYPERCALL ".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xc1"
#endif
/* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall
* instruction. The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the

2
arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
extern char __brk_base[], __brk_limit[];
extern struct exception_table_entry __stop___ex_table[];
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
extern char __end_rodata_hpage_align[];
#endif

6
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
View File

@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ within(unsigned long addr, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
static unsigned long text_ip_addr(unsigned long ip)
{
/*
* On x86_64, kernel text mappings are mapped read-only with
* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA. So we use the kernel identity mapping instead
* of the kernel text mapping to modify the kernel text.
* On x86_64, kernel text mappings are mapped read-only, so we use
* the kernel identity mapping instead of the kernel text mapping
* to modify the kernel text.
*
* For 32bit kernels, these mappings are same and we can use
* kernel identity mapping to modify code.

8
arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
View File

@ -750,9 +750,7 @@ void kgdb_arch_set_pc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long ip)
int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
{
int err;
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
char opc[BREAK_INSTR_SIZE];
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
bpt->type = BP_BREAKPOINT;
err = probe_kernel_read(bpt->saved_instr, (char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
@ -761,7 +759,6 @@ int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
return err;
err = probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
if (!err)
return err;
/*
@ -778,13 +775,12 @@ int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
if (memcmp(opc, arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
bpt->type = BP_POKE_BREAKPOINT;
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
return err;
}
int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
int err;
char opc[BREAK_INSTR_SIZE];
@ -801,8 +797,8 @@ int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
if (err || memcmp(opc, bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE))
goto knl_write;
return err;
knl_write:
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
return probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
(char *)bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
}

2
arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c
View File

@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ static int test_NX(void)
* by the error message
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
/* Test 3: Check if the .rodata section is executable */
if (rodata_test_data != 0xC3) {
printk(KERN_ERR "test_nx: .rodata marker has invalid value\n");
@ -151,7 +150,6 @@ static int test_NX(void)
printk(KERN_ERR "test_nx: .rodata section is executable\n");
ret = -ENODEV;
}
#endif
#if 0
/* Test 4: Check if the .data section of a module is executable */

2
arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c
View File

@ -76,5 +76,5 @@ int rodata_test(void)
}
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA infrastructure");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Testcase for marking rodata as read-only");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>");

25
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
View File

@ -41,29 +41,28 @@ ENTRY(phys_startup_64)
jiffies_64 = jiffies;
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
/*
* On 64-bit, align RODATA to 2MB so that even with CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
* we retain large page mappings for boundaries spanning kernel text, rodata
* and data sections.
* On 64-bit, align RODATA to 2MB so we retain large page mappings for
* boundaries spanning kernel text, rodata and data sections.
*
* However, kernel identity mappings will have different RWX permissions
* to the pages mapping to text and to the pages padding (which are freed) the
* text section. Hence kernel identity mappings will be broken to smaller
* pages. For 64-bit, kernel text and kernel identity mappings are different,
* so we can enable protection checks that come with CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA,
* as well as retain 2MB large page mappings for kernel text.
* so we can enable protection checks as well as retain 2MB large page
* mappings for kernel text.
*/
#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_BEGIN . = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE);
#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN . = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE);
#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_END \
#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END \
. = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE); \
__end_rodata_hpage_align = .;
#else
#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_BEGIN
#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_END
#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN
#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END
#endif
@ -112,13 +111,11 @@ SECTIONS
EXCEPTION_TABLE(16) :text = 0x9090
#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
/* .text should occupy whole number of pages */
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
#endif
X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_BEGIN
X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN
RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_END
X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END
/* Data */
.data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {

3
arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
View File

@ -871,7 +871,6 @@ static noinline int do_test_wp_bit(void)
return flag;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
const int rodata_test_data = 0xC3;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rodata_test_data);
@ -960,5 +959,3 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
debug_checkwx();
}
#endif

3
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
View File

@ -1074,7 +1074,6 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
mem_init_print_info(NULL);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
const int rodata_test_data = 0xC3;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rodata_test_data);
@ -1166,8 +1165,6 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
debug_checkwx();
}
#endif
int kern_addr_valid(unsigned long addr)
{
unsigned long above = ((long)addr) >> __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT;

2
arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
View File

@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
__pa_symbol(__end_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
/*
* Once the kernel maps the text as RO (kernel_set_to_readonly is set),
* kernel text mappings for the large page aligned text, rodata sections