forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
Yama: higher restrictions should block PTRACE_TRACEME
The higher ptrace restriction levels should be blocking even PTRACE_TRACEME requests. The comments in the LSM documentation are misleading about when the checks happen (the parent does not go through security_ptrace_access_check() on a PTRACE_TRACEME call). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5.x and later Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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@ -46,14 +46,13 @@ restrictions, it can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY, ...)
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so that any otherwise allowed process (even those in external pid namespaces)
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may attach.
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These restrictions do not change how ptrace via PTRACE_TRACEME operates.
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The sysctl settings are:
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The sysctl settings (writable only with CAP_SYS_PTRACE) are:
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0 - classic ptrace permissions: a process can PTRACE_ATTACH to any other
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process running under the same uid, as long as it is dumpable (i.e.
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did not transition uids, start privileged, or have called
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prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...) already).
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prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...) already). Similarly, PTRACE_TRACEME is
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unchanged.
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1 - restricted ptrace: a process must have a predefined relationship
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with the inferior it wants to call PTRACE_ATTACH on. By default,
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@ -61,12 +60,13 @@ The sysctl settings are:
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classic criteria is also met. To change the relationship, an
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inferior can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, debugger, ...) to declare
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an allowed debugger PID to call PTRACE_ATTACH on the inferior.
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Using PTRACE_TRACEME is unchanged.
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2 - admin-only attach: only processes with CAP_SYS_PTRACE may use ptrace
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with PTRACE_ATTACH.
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with PTRACE_ATTACH, or through children calling PTRACE_TRACEME.
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3 - no attach: no processes may use ptrace with PTRACE_ATTACH. Once set,
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this sysctl cannot be changed to a lower value.
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3 - no attach: no processes may use ptrace with PTRACE_ATTACH nor via
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PTRACE_TRACEME. Once set, this sysctl value cannot be changed.
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The original children-only logic was based on the restrictions in grsecurity.
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@ -1242,8 +1242,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
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* Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
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* current process before allowing the current process to present itself
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* to the @parent process for tracing.
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* The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
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* checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
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* @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
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* Return 0 if permission is granted.
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* @capget:
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@ -290,10 +290,51 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
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return rc;
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}
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/**
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* yama_ptrace_traceme - validate PTRACE_TRACEME calls
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* @parent: task that will become the ptracer of the current task
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*
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* Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
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*/
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static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
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{
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int rc;
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/* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should
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* only tighten restrictions further.
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*/
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rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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/* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */
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switch (ptrace_scope) {
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case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY:
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if (!ns_capable(task_user_ns(parent), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
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rc = -EPERM;
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break;
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case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH:
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rc = -EPERM;
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break;
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}
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if (rc) {
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char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
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printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
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"ptraceme of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
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current->pid,
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get_task_comm(name, parent),
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parent->pid);
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}
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return rc;
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}
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static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
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.name = "yama",
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.ptrace_access_check = yama_ptrace_access_check,
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.ptrace_traceme = yama_ptrace_traceme,
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.task_prctl = yama_task_prctl,
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.task_free = yama_task_free,
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};
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