forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
Currently XFS calls file_remove_privs() without holding i_mutex. This is wrong because that function can end up messing with file permissions and file capabilities stored in xattrs for which we need i_mutex held. Fix the problem by grabbing iolock exclusively when we will need to change anything in permissions / xattrs. Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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@ -563,6 +563,13 @@ xfs_file_aio_write_checks(
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if (error)
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return error;
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/* For changing security info in file_remove_privs() we need i_mutex */
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if (*iolock == XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED && !IS_NOSEC(inode)) {
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xfs_rw_iunlock(ip, *iolock);
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*iolock = XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL;
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xfs_rw_ilock(ip, *iolock);
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goto restart;
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}
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/*
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* If the offset is beyond the size of the file, we need to zero any
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* blocks that fall between the existing EOF and the start of this
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@ -623,7 +630,9 @@ xfs_file_aio_write_checks(
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* setgid bits if the process is not being run by root. This keeps
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* people from modifying setuid and setgid binaries.
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*/
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return file_remove_privs(file);
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if (!IS_NOSEC(inode))
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return file_remove_privs(file);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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