forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
ipvs: Add missing locking during connection table hashing and unhashing
The code that hashes and unhashes connections from the connection table is missing locking of the connection being modified, which opens up a race condition and results in memory corruption when this race condition is hit. Here is what happens in pretty verbose form: CPU 0 CPU 1 ------------ ------------ An active connection is terminated and we schedule ip_vs_conn_expire() on this CPU to expire this connection. IRQ assignment is changed to this CPU, but the expire timer stays scheduled on the other CPU. New connection from same ip:port comes in right before the timer expires, we find the inactive connection in our connection table and get a reference to it. We proper lock the connection in tcp_state_transition() and read the connection flags in set_tcp_state(). ip_vs_conn_expire() gets called, we unhash the connection from our connection table and remove the hashed flag in ip_vs_conn_unhash(), without proper locking! While still holding proper locks we write the connection flags in set_tcp_state() and this sets the hashed flag again. ip_vs_conn_expire() fails to expire the connection, because the other CPU has incremented the reference count. We try to re-insert the connection into our connection table, but this fails in ip_vs_conn_hash(), because the hashed flag has been set by the other CPU. We re-schedule execution of ip_vs_conn_expire(). Now this connection has the hashed flag set, but isn't actually hashed in our connection table and has a dangling list_head. We drop the reference we held on the connection and schedule the expire timer for timeouting the connection on this CPU. Further packets won't be able to find this connection in our connection table. ip_vs_conn_expire() gets called again, we think it's already hashed, but the list_head is dangling and while removing the connection from our connection table we write to the memory location where this list_head points to. The result will probably be a kernel oops at some other point in time. This race condition is pretty subtle, but it can be triggered remotely. It needs the IRQ assignment change or another circumstance where packets coming from the same ip:port for the same service are being processed on different CPUs. And it involves hitting the exact time at which ip_vs_conn_expire() gets called. It can be avoided by making sure that all packets from one connection are always processed on the same CPU and can be made harder to exploit by changing the connection timeouts to some custom values. Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net> Cc: stable@kernel.org Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
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@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static inline int ip_vs_conn_hash(struct ip_vs_conn *cp)
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hash = ip_vs_conn_hashkey(cp->af, cp->protocol, &cp->caddr, cp->cport);
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ct_write_lock(hash);
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spin_lock(&cp->lock);
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if (!(cp->flags & IP_VS_CONN_F_HASHED)) {
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list_add(&cp->c_list, &ip_vs_conn_tab[hash]);
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@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ static inline int ip_vs_conn_hash(struct ip_vs_conn *cp)
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ret = 0;
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}
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spin_unlock(&cp->lock);
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ct_write_unlock(hash);
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return ret;
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@ -193,6 +195,7 @@ static inline int ip_vs_conn_unhash(struct ip_vs_conn *cp)
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hash = ip_vs_conn_hashkey(cp->af, cp->protocol, &cp->caddr, cp->cport);
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ct_write_lock(hash);
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spin_lock(&cp->lock);
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if (cp->flags & IP_VS_CONN_F_HASHED) {
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list_del(&cp->c_list);
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@ -202,6 +205,7 @@ static inline int ip_vs_conn_unhash(struct ip_vs_conn *cp)
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} else
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ret = 0;
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spin_unlock(&cp->lock);
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ct_write_unlock(hash);
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return ret;
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