AcoSail/kernel_optimize_test
8
0
Fork 0
forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
Code Pull Requests Activity

x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb

Browse Source 
commit 3ebc170068885b6fc7bedda6c667bb2c4d533159 upstream.

jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead.
It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but
it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary
instruction boundaries.

On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates
"arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries".

But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block
boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker
predictions.

On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP
or no-SMT):

  1) Nothing		System wide open
  2) jmp2ret		May stop a script kiddy
  3) jmp2ret+chickenbit  Raises the bar rather further
  4) IBPB		Only thing which can count as "safe".

Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit
on Zen1 according to lmbench.

  [ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ]

Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
[bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Zijlstra 2022-06-14 23:16:02 +02:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent f728eff263
commit c8845b8754
6 changed files with 67 additions and 13 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
View File

@ -4666,6 +4666,9 @@
disabling SMT if necessary for
the full mitigation (only on Zen1
and older without STIBP).
ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on
basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest
perf impact.
unret - force enable untrained return thunks,
only effective on AMD f15h-f17h
based systems.

2
arch/x86/entry/Makefile
View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
CFLAGS_syscall_x32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
obj-y := entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o
obj-y := entry.o entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o
obj-y += common.o
obj-y += vdso/

22
arch/x86/entry/entry.S Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* Common place for both 32- and 64-bit entry routines.
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
.pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax"
SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb)
movl $MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx
movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
xorl %edx, %edx
wrmsr
RET
SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb)
/* For KVM */
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb);
.popsection

2
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
View File

@ -292,7 +292,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
/* FREE! (11*32+ 8) */
/* FREE! (11*32+ 9) */
/* FREE! (11*32+10) */
#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */
/* FREE! (11*32+11) */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */

8
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
View File

@ -123,14 +123,17 @@
* return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
* typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
*
* Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack.
* While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
* entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
*
* As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
* where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
*/
.macro UNTRAIN_RET
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
"call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
"call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
#endif
.endm
@ -144,6 +147,7 @@
extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
extern void entry_ibpb(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE

43
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
View File

@ -761,6 +761,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
enum retbleed_mitigation {
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
};
@ -769,11 +770,13 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
RETBLEED_CMD_OFF,
RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO,
RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET,
RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB,
};
const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
};
@ -803,6 +806,8 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) {
retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) {
retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) {
retbleed_nosmt = true;
} else {
@ -817,11 +822,13 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler; falling back to IBPB!\n"
#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
{
bool mitigate_smt = false;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
return;
@ -833,11 +840,21 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
break;
case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB:
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
break;
case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
default:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK))
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
else
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
}
/*
* The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
@ -853,26 +870,34 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ||
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) {
pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG);
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
break;
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
goto retbleed_force_ibpb;
}
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) &&
(retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
cpu_smt_disable(false);
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG);
mitigate_smt = true;
break;
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
retbleed_force_ibpb:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
mitigate_smt = true;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (mitigate_smt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) &&
(retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
cpu_smt_disable(false);
/*
* Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
* retbleed= cmdline option.