forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
Bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack
Attack scenario: 1. A Chromebook (let's call this device A) is paired to a legitimate Bluetooth classic device (e.g. a speaker) (let's call this device B). 2. A malicious device (let's call this device C) pretends to be the Bluetooth speaker by using the same BT address. 3. If device A is not currently connected to device B, device A will be ready to accept connection from device B in the background (technically, doing Page Scan). 4. Therefore, device C can initiate connection to device A (because device A is doing Page Scan) and device A will accept the connection because device A trusts device C's address which is the same as device B's address. 5. Device C won't be able to communicate at any high level Bluetooth profile with device A because device A enforces that device C is encrypted with their common Link Key, which device C doesn't have. But device C can initiate pairing with device A with just-works model without requiring user interaction (there is only pairing notification). After pairing, device A now trusts device C with a new different link key, common between device A and C. 6. From now on, device A trusts device C, so device C can at anytime connect to device A to do any kind of high-level hijacking, e.g. speaker hijack or mouse/keyboard hijack. Since we don't know whether the repairing is legitimate or not, leave the decision to user space if all the conditions below are met. - the pairing is initialized by peer - the authorization method is just-work - host already had the link key to the peer Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <howardchung@google.com> Acked-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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c920a19130
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@ -4557,6 +4557,16 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
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goto confirm;
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}
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/* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
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* decision to user space since the remote device could be
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* legitimate or malicious.
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*/
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if (hci_find_link_key(hdev, &ev->bdaddr)) {
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bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Local host already has link key");
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confirm_hint = 1;
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goto confirm;
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}
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BT_DBG("Auto-accept of user confirmation with %ums delay",
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hdev->auto_accept_delay);
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@ -2168,6 +2168,25 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
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smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
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smp->prnd);
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SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
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/* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
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if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
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goto mackey_and_ltk;
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/* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave
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* the decision to user space since the remote device could
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* be legitimate or malicious.
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*/
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if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
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hcon->role)) {
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err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
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hcon->type,
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hcon->dst_type,
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passkey, 1);
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if (err)
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return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
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set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
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}
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}
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mackey_and_ltk:
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