forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
kernel/sysctl.c: ignore out-of-range taint bits introduced via kernel.tainted
Users with SYS_ADMIN capability can add arbitrary taint flags to the running kernel by writing to /proc/sys/kernel/tainted or issuing the command 'sysctl -w kernel.tainted=...'. This interface, however, is open for any integer value and this might cause an invalid set of flags being committed to the tainted_mask bitset. This patch introduces a simple way for proc_taint() to ignore any eventual invalid bit coming from the user input before committing those bits to the kernel tainted_mask. Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200512223946.888020-1-aquini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -880,10 +880,9 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
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* Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
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* to everyone's atomic.h for this
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) {
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if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1)
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for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
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if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
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add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
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}
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}
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return err;
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