forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
tty: vt_ioctl: fix potential Spectre v1
vsa.console is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:711 vt_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'vc_cons' [r] Fix this by sanitizing vsa.console before using it to index vc_cons Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Reviewed-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
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#include <asm/io.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include <linux/kbd_kern.h>
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#include <linux/vt_kern.h>
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#include <linux/kbd_diacr.h>
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@ -700,6 +702,8 @@ int vt_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty,
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if (vsa.console == 0 || vsa.console > MAX_NR_CONSOLES)
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ret = -ENXIO;
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else {
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vsa.console = array_index_nospec(vsa.console,
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MAX_NR_CONSOLES + 1);
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vsa.console--;
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console_lock();
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ret = vc_allocate(vsa.console);
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