forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
client MUST ignore EncryptionKeyLength if CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY is set
[MS-SMB] 2.2.4.5.2.1 states: "ChallengeLength (1 byte): When the CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY bit is set, the server MUST set this value to zero and clients MUST ignore this value." Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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@ -625,9 +625,8 @@ CIFSSMBNegotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
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server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_UNENCAP;
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memcpy(ses->server->cryptkey, pSMBr->u.EncryptionKey,
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CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
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} else if ((pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC ||
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server->capabilities & CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY) &&
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(pSMBr->EncryptionKeyLength == 0)) {
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} else if (pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC ||
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server->capabilities & CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY) {
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server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED;
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rc = decode_ext_sec_blob(ses, pSMBr);
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} else if (server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT) {
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