Currently, when we add a new user key, the calltrace as below:
add_key()
key_create_or_update()
key_alloc()
__key_instantiate_and_link
generic_key_instantiate
key_payload_reserve
......
Since commit a08bf91ce2 ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"),
we can reach max bytes/keys in key_alloc, but we forget to remove this
limit when we reserver space for payload in key_payload_reserve. So we
can only reach max keys but not max bytes when having delta between plen
and type->def_datalen. Remove this limit when instantiating the key, so we
can keep consistent with key_alloc.
Also, fix the similar problem in keyctl_chown_key().
Fixes: 0b77f5bfb4 ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Fixes: a08bf91ce2 ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Pull IMA fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"Two bug fixes and an associated change for each.
The one that adds SM3 to the IMA list of supported hash algorithms is
a simple change, but could be considered a new feature"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: add sm3 algorithm to hash algorithm configuration list
crypto: rename sm3-256 to sm3 in hash_algo_name
efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found
x86/ima: use correct identifier for SetupMode variable
sm3 has been supported by the ima hash algorithm, but it is not
yet in the Kconfig configuration list. After adding, both ima and tpm2
can support sm3 well.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.
But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
is used.
So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
the kernel log ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:
[ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
[ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small fixes: one fixes a locking problem in the recently merged
label translation code, the other fixes an embarrassing 'binderfs' /
'binder' filesystem name check"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix sidtab string cache locking
selinux: fix typo in filesystem name
Pull vfs file system parameter updates from Al Viro:
"Saner fs_parser.c guts and data structures. The system-wide registry
of syntax types (string/enum/int32/oct32/.../etc.) is gone and so is
the horror switch() in fs_parse() that would have to grow another case
every time something got added to that system-wide registry.
New syntax types can be added by filesystems easily now, and their
namespace is that of functions - not of system-wide enum members. IOW,
they can be shared or kept private and if some turn out to be widely
useful, we can make them common library helpers, etc., without having
to do anything whatsoever to fs_parse() itself.
And we already get that kind of requests - the thing that finally
pushed me into doing that was "oh, and let's add one for timeouts -
things like 15s or 2h". If some filesystem really wants that, let them
do it. Without somebody having to play gatekeeper for the variants
blessed by direct support in fs_parse(), TYVM.
Quite a bit of boilerplate is gone. And IMO the data structures make a
lot more sense now. -200LoC, while we are at it"
* 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (25 commits)
tmpfs: switch to use of invalfc()
cgroup1: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
procfs: switch to use of invalfc()
hugetlbfs: switch to use of invalfc()
cramfs: switch to use of errofc() et.al.
gfs2: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
fuse: switch to use errorfc() et.al.
ceph: use errorfc() and friends instead of spelling the prefix out
prefix-handling analogues of errorf() and friends
turn fs_param_is_... into functions
fs_parse: handle optional arguments sanely
fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_spec
fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name field
add prefix to fs_context->log
ceph_parse_param(), ceph_parse_mon_ips(): switch to passing fc_log
new primitive: __fs_parse()
switch rbd and libceph to p_log-based primitives
struct p_log, variants of warnf() et.al. taking that one instead
teach logfc() to handle prefices, give it saner calling conventions
get rid of cg_invalf()
...
Unused now.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.6' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack fix from Casey Schaufler:
"One fix for an obscure error found using an old version of ping(1)
that did not use IPv6 sockets in the documented way"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.6' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian buster
Avoiding taking a lock in an IRQ context is not enough to prevent
deadlocks, as discovered by syzbot:
===
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
5.5.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.0/8927 [HC0[0]:SC0[2]:HE1:SE0] is trying to acquire:
ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: sidtab_sid2str_put.part.0+0x36/0x880 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c:533
and this task is already holding:
ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: nf_conntrack_lock+0x17/0x70 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:91
which would create a new lock dependency:
(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.} -> (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}
but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}
[...]
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock);
lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
[...]
===
Fix this by simply locking with irqsave/irqrestore and stop giving up on
!in_task(). It makes the locking a bit slower, but it shouldn't make a
big difference in real workloads. Under the scenario from [1] (only
cache hits) it only increased the runtime overhead from the
security_secid_to_secctx() function from ~2% to ~3% (it was ~5-65%
before introducing the cache).
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259
Fixes: d97bd23c2d ("selinux: cache the SID -> context string translation")
Reported-by: syzbot+61cba5033e2072d61806@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Correct the filesystem name to "binder" to enable genfscon per-file
labelling for binderfs.
Fixes: 7a4b519474 ("selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfs")
Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: slight style changes to the subj/description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
I am seeing ping failures to IPv6 linklocal addresses with Debian
buster. Easiest example to reproduce is:
$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect: Invalid argument
$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
PING ff02::01%eth1(ff02::1%eth1) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from fe80::e0:f9ff:fe0c:37%eth1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.059 ms
git bisect traced the failure to
commit b9ef5513c9 ("smack: Check address length before reading address family")
Arguably ping is being stupid since the buster version is not setting
the address family properly (ping on stretch for example does):
$ strace -e connect ping6 -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect(5, {sa_family=AF_UNSPEC,
sa_data="\4\1\0\0\0\0\377\2\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\1\3\0\0\0"}, 28)
= -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)
but the command works fine on kernels prior to this commit, so this is
breakage which goes against the Linux paradigm of "don't break userspace"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
This kunit update for Linux 5.6-rc1 consists of:
-- Support for building kunit as a module from Alan Maguire
-- AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack from Mike Salvatore
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Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-5.6-rc1-kunit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest
Pull Kselftest kunit updates from Shuah Khan:
"This kunit update consists of:
- Support for building kunit as a module from Alan Maguire
- AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack from Mike Salvatore"
* tag 'linux-kselftest-5.6-rc1-kunit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest:
kunit: building kunit as a module breaks allmodconfig
kunit: update documentation to describe module-based build
kunit: allow kunit to be loaded as a module
kunit: remove timeout dependence on sysctl_hung_task_timeout_seconds
kunit: allow kunit tests to be loaded as a module
kunit: hide unexported try-catch interface in try-catch-impl.h
kunit: move string-stream.h to lib/kunit
apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack
Pull openat2 support from Al Viro:
"This is the openat2() series from Aleksa Sarai.
I'm afraid that the rest of namei stuff will have to wait - it got
zero review the last time I'd posted #work.namei, and there had been a
leak in the posted series I'd caught only last weekend. I was going to
repost it on Monday, but the window opened and the odds of getting any
review during that... Oh, well.
Anyway, openat2 part should be ready; that _did_ get sane amount of
review and public testing, so here it comes"
From Aleksa's description of the series:
"For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown
flags are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road
to being added to openat(2).
Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path
resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent
breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace
applications.
This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset
(which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which
was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and
changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as
others I felt were useful.
In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of
AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However,
instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new
syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the
openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The
following new LOOKUP_* flags are added:
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV:
Blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through
absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not
trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is
also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are
permitted).
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS:
Blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done
by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a
filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only
reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change
the name.
It should be noted that this is different to the scope of
~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However,
you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it
will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a
magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.
In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new
LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required.
LOOKUP_BENEATH:
Disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's
tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute
paths in openat(2) are also disallowed.
Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain
point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional
to protect against various races that would allow escape using
"..".
Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it
can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the
protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done
as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.
In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS:
Does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at
all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this
can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as
long as no parent path had a symlink component.
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT:
This is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking
attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be
scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like
protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem
operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that
chroot(2) is not.
If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is
generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to
cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.
The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which
currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening
paths in a potentially malicious container.
There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by
having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101,
CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a
few).
In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on
libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution.
It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support
openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and
thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.
Future work would include implementing things like
RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow
programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles)"
* 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags
selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution
namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing
namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution
namei: allow set_root() to produce errors
namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors
nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int
namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"Just one minor fix this time"
* 'for-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: remove EARLY_LSM_COUNT which never used
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Two new features - measuring certificates and querying IMA for a file
hash - and three bug fixes:
- Measuring certificates is like the rest of IMA, based on policy,
but requires loading a custom policy. Certificates loaded onto a
keyring, for example during early boot, before a custom policy has
been loaded, are queued and only processed after loading the custom
policy.
- IMA calculates and caches files hashes. Other kernel subsystems,
and possibly kernel modules, are interested in accessing these
cached file hashes.
The bug fixes prevent classifying a file short read (e.g. shutdown) as
an invalid file signature, add a missing blank when displaying the
securityfs policy rules containing LSM labels, and, lastly, fix the
handling of the IMA policy information for unknown LSM labels"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
IMA: Defined delayed workqueue to free the queued keys
IMA: Call workqueue functions to measure queued keys
IMA: Define workqueue for early boot key measurements
IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string
ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes
ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file
ima: Add a space after printing LSM rules for readability
IMA: fix measuring asymmetric keys Kconfig
IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy
IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys
KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys
IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys
IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys
IMA: Check IMA policy flag
ima: avoid appraise error for hash calc interrupt
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add WireGuard
2) Add HE and TWT support to ath11k driver, from John Crispin.
3) Add ESP in TCP encapsulation support, from Sabrina Dubroca.
4) Add variable window congestion control to TIPC, from Jon Maloy.
5) Add BCM84881 PHY driver, from Russell King.
6) Start adding netlink support for ethtool operations, from Michal
Kubecek.
7) Add XDP drop and TX action support to ena driver, from Sameeh
Jubran.
8) Add new ipv4 route notifications so that mlxsw driver does not have
to handle identical routes itself. From Ido Schimmel.
9) Add BPF dynamic program extensions, from Alexei Starovoitov.
10) Support RX and TX timestamping in igc, from Vinicius Costa Gomes.
11) Add support for macsec HW offloading, from Antoine Tenart.
12) Add initial support for MPTCP protocol, from Christoph Paasch,
Matthieu Baerts, Florian Westphal, Peter Krystad, and many others.
13) Add Octeontx2 PF support, from Sunil Goutham, Geetha sowjanya, Linu
Cherian, and others.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1469 commits)
net: phy: add default ARCH_BCM_IPROC for MDIO_BCM_IPROC
udp: segment looped gso packets correctly
netem: change mailing list
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 debug features
qed: rt init valid initialization changed
qed: Debug feature: ilt and mdump
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Add fw overlay feature
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 HSI changes
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 iscsi/fcoe changes
qed: Add abstraction for different hsi values per chip
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Additional ll2 type
qed: Use dmae to write to widebus registers in fw_funcs
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Parser offsets modified
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Queue Manager changes
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Expose new registers and change windows
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Internal ram offsets modifications
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Marvell OcteonTX2 Physical Function driver
Documentation: net: octeontx2: Add RVU HW and drivers overview
octeontx2-pf: ethtool RSS config support
octeontx2-pf: Add basic ethtool support
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200127' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux update from Paul Moore:
"This is one of the bigger SELinux pull requests in recent years with
28 patches. Everything is passing our test suite and the highlights
are below:
- Mark CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE as deprecated. We're some time
away from actually attempting to remove this in the kernel, but the
only distro we know that still uses it (Fedora) is working on
moving away from this so we want to at least let people know we are
planning to remove it.
- Reorder the SELinux hooks to help prevent bad things when SELinux
is disabled at runtime. The proper fix is to remove the
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE functionality (see above) and just
take care of it at boot time (e.g. "selinux=0").
- Add SELinux controls for the kernel lockdown functionality,
introducing a new SELinux class/permissions: "lockdown { integrity
confidentiality }".
- Add a SELinux control for move_mount(2) that reuses the "file {
mounton }" permission.
- Improvements to the SELinux security label data store lookup
functions to speed up translations between our internal label
representations and the visible string labels (both directions).
- Revisit a previous fix related to SELinux inode auditing and
permission caching and do it correctly this time.
- Fix the SELinux access decision cache to cleanup properly on error.
In some extreme cases this could limit the cache size and result in
a decrease in performance.
- Enable SELinux per-file labeling for binderfs.
- The SELinux initialized and disabled flags were wrapped with
accessors to ensure they are accessed correctly.
- Mark several key SELinux structures with __randomize_layout.
- Changes to the LSM build configuration to only build
security/lsm_audit.c when needed.
- Changes to the SELinux build configuration to only build the IB
object cache when CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND is enabled.
- Move a number of single-caller functions into their callers.
- Documentation fixes (/selinux -> /sys/fs/selinux).
- A handful of cleanup patches that aren't worth mentioning on their
own, the individual descriptions have plenty of detail"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200127' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (28 commits)
selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall
selinux: do not allocate ancillary buffer on first load
selinux: remove redundant allocation and helper functions
selinux: remove redundant selinux_nlmsg_perm
selinux: fix wrong buffer types in policydb.c
selinux: reorder hooks to make runtime disable less broken
selinux: treat atomic flags more carefully
selinux: make default_noexec read-only after init
selinux: move ibpkeys code under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND.
selinux: remove redundant msg_msg_alloc_security
Documentation,selinux: fix references to old selinuxfs mount point
selinux: deprecate disabling SELinux and runtime
selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfs
selinuxfs: use scnprintf to get real length for inode
selinux: remove set but not used variable 'sidtab'
selinux: ensure the policy has been loaded before reading the sidtab stats
selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()
selinux: randomize layout of key structures
selinux: clean up selinux_enabled/disabled/enforcing_boot
selinux: remove unnecessary selinux cred request
...
This macro is never used from it was introduced in commit e6b1db98cf
("security: Support early LSMs"), better to remove it.
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Keys queued for measurement should be freed if a custom IMA policy
was not loaded. Otherwise, the keys will remain queued forever
consuming kernel memory.
This patch defines a delayed workqueue to handle the above scenario.
The workqueue handler is setup to execute 5 minutes after IMA
initialization is completed.
If a custom IMA policy is loaded before the workqueue handler is
scheduled to execute, the workqueue task is cancelled and any queued keys
are processed for measurement. But if a custom policy was not loaded then
the queued keys are just freed when the delayed workqueue handler is run.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> # sleeping
function called from invalid context
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # redefinition of
ima_init_key_queue() function.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys should
be queued for measurement if a custom IMA policy is not yet loaded.
Keys queued for measurement, if any, should be processed when a custom
policy is loaded.
This patch updates the IMA hook function ima_post_key_create_or_update()
to queue the key if a custom IMA policy has not yet been loaded. And,
ima_update_policy() function, which is called when a custom IMA policy
is loaded, is updated to process queued keys.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys created
or updated before a custom IMA policy is loaded should be queued and
will be processed after a custom policy is loaded.
This patch defines a workqueue for queuing keys when a custom IMA policy
has not yet been loaded. An intermediate Kconfig boolean option namely
IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS is used to declare the workqueue functions.
A flag namely ima_process_keys is used to check if the key should be
queued or should be processed immediately.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
ima_match_keyring() is called while holding rcu read lock. Since this
function executes in atomic context, it should not call any function
that can sleep (such as kstrdup()).
This patch pre-allocates a buffer to hold the keyrings string read from
the IMA policy and uses that to match the given keyring.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: e9085e0ad3 ("IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Keep the ima policy rules around from the beginning even if they appear
invalid at the time of loading, as they may become active after an lsm
policy load. However, loading a custom IMA policy with unknown LSM
labels is only safe after we have transitioned from the "built-in"
policy rules to a custom IMA policy.
Patch also fixes the rule re-use during the lsm policy reload and makes
some prints a bit more human readable.
Changelog:
v4:
- Do not allow the initial policy load refer to non-existing lsm rules.
v3:
- Fix too wide policy rule matching for non-initialized LSMs
v2:
- Fix log prints
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konsta Karsisto <konsta.karsisto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This allows other parts of the kernel (perhaps a stacked LSM allowing
system monitoring, eg. the proposed KRSI LSM [1]) to retrieve the hash
of a given file from IMA if it's present in the iint cache.
It's true that the existence of the hash means that it's also in the
audit logs or in /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements,
but it can be difficult to pull that information out for every
subsequent exec. This is especially true if a given host has been up
for a long time and the file was first measured a long time ago.
It should be kept in mind that this function gives access to cached
entries which can be removed, for instance on security_inode_free().
This is based on Peter Moody's patch:
https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/33036180/
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/10/393
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When reading ima_policy from securityfs, there is a missing
space between output string of LSM rules and the remaining
rules.
Signed-off-by: Clay Chang <clayc@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
commit 2db154b3ea ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM
security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any existing
LSM. This creates a regression for SELinux with respect to consistent
checking of mounts; the existing selinux_mount hook checks mounton
permission to the mount point path. Provide a SELinux hook
implementation for move_mount that applies this same check for
consistency. In the future we may wish to add a new move_mount
filesystem permission and check as well, but this addresses
the immediate regression.
Fixes: 2db154b3ea ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In security_load_policy(), we can defer allocating the newpolicydb
ancillary array to after checking state->initialized, thereby avoiding
the pointless allocation when loading policy the first time.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: merged portions by hand]
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch removes the inode, file, and superblock security blob
allocation functions and moves the associated code into the
respective LSM hooks. This patch also removes the inode_doinit()
function as it was a trivial wrapper around
inode_doinit_with_dentry() and called from one location in the code.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux_nlmsg_perm is used for only by selinux_netlink_send. Remove
the redundant function to simplify the code.
Fix a typo by suggestion from Stephen.
Signed-off-by: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Two places used u32 where there should have been __le32.
Fixes sparse warnings:
CHECK [...]/security/selinux/ss/services.c
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype]
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch adds vlan rtm definitions:
- NEWVLAN: to be used for creating vlans, setting options and
notifications
- DELVLAN: to be used for deleting vlans
- GETVLAN: used for dumping vlan information
Dumping vlans which can span multiple messages is added now with basic
information (vid and flags). We use nlmsg_parse() to validate the header
length in order to be able to extend the message with filtering
attributes later.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kunit tests that do not support module build should depend
on KUNIT=y rather than just KUNIT in Kconfig, otherwise
they will trigger compilation errors for "make allmodconfig"
builds.
Fixes: 9fe124bf1b ("kunit: allow kunit to be loaded as a module")
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") switched the LSM
infrastructure to use per-hook lists, which meant that removing the
hooks for a given module was no longer atomic. Even though the commit
clearly documents that modules implementing runtime revmoval of hooks
(only SELinux attempts this madness) need to take special precautions to
avoid race conditions, SELinux has never addressed this.
By inserting an artificial delay between the loop iterations of
security_delete_hooks() (I used 100 ms), booting to a state where
SELinux is enabled, but policy is not yet loaded, and running these
commands:
while true; do ping -c 1 <some IP>; done &
echo -n 1 >/sys/fs/selinux/disable
kill %1
wait
...I was able to trigger NULL pointer dereferences in various places. I
also have a report of someone getting panics on a stock RHEL-8 kernel
after setting SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config and rebooting
(without adding "selinux=0" to kernel command-line).
Reordering the SELinux hooks such that those that allocate structures
are removed last seems to prevent these panics. It is very much possible
that this doesn't make the runtime disable completely race-free, but at
least it makes the operation much less fragile.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The disabled/enforcing/initialized flags are all accessed concurrently
by threads so use the appropriate accessors that ensure atomicity and
document that it is expected.
Use smp_load/acquire...() helpers (with memory barriers) for the
initialized flag, since it gates access to the rest of the state
structures.
Note that the disabled flag is currently not used for anything other
than avoiding double disable, but it will be used for bailing out of
hooks once security_delete_hooks() is removed.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux checks whether VM_EXEC is set in the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
during initialization and saves the result in default_noexec for use
in its mmap and mprotect hook function implementations to decide
whether to apply EXECMEM, EXECHEAP, EXECSTACK, and EXECMOD checks.
Mark default_noexec as ro_after_init to prevent later clearing it
and thereby disabling these checks. It is only set legitimately from
init code.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move cache based pkey sid retrieval code which was added
with commit "409dcf31" under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND.
As its going to alloc a new cache which impacts
low RAM devices which was enabled by default.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org>
[PM: checkpatch.pl cleanups, fixed capitalization in the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security only calls msg_msg_alloc_security but
do nothing else. And also msg_msg_alloc_security is just used by the
former.
Remove the redundant function to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add KUnit tests to test AppArmor unpacking of userspace policies.
AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policies. To find
policy format documentation see
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst.
In order to write the tests against the policy unpacking code, some
static functions needed to be exposed for testing purposes. One of the
goals of this patch is to establish a pattern for which testing these
kinds of functions should be done in the future.
Signed-off-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
As a result of the asymmetric public keys subtype Kconfig option being
defined as tristate, with the existing IMA Makefile, ima_asymmetric_keys.c
could be built as a kernel module. To prevent this from happening, this
patch defines and uses an intermediate Kconfig boolean option named
IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: James.Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # ima_asymmetric_keys.c
is built as a kernel module.
Fixes: 88e70da170 ("IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys")
Fixes: cb1aa3823c ("KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys")
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
selinuxfs was originally mounted on /selinux, and various docs and
kconfig help texts referred to nodes under it. In Linux 3.0,
/sys/fs/selinux was introduced as the preferred mount point for selinuxfs.
Fix all the old references to /selinux/ to /sys/fs/selinux/.
While we are there, update the description of the selinux boot parameter
to reflect the fact that the default value is always 1 since
commit be6ec88f41 ("selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE")
and drop discussion of runtime disable since it is deprecated.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Deprecate the CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE functionality. The
code was originally developed to make it easier for Linux
distributions to support architectures where adding parameters to the
kernel command line was difficult. Unfortunately, supporting runtime
disable meant we had to make some security trade-offs when it came to
the LSM hooks, as documented in the Kconfig help text:
NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init'
kernel hardening feature for security hooks. Please consider
using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this
option.
Fortunately it looks as if that the original motivation for the
runtime disable functionality is gone, and Fedora/RHEL appears to be
the only major distribution enabling this capability at build time
so we are now taking steps to remove it entirely from the kernel.
The first step is to mark the functionality as deprecated and print
an error when it is used (what this patch is doing). As Fedora/RHEL
makes progress in transitioning the distribution away from runtime
disable, we will introduce follow-up patches over several kernel
releases which will block for increasing periods of time when the
runtime disable is used. Finally we will remove the option entirely
once we believe all users have moved to the kernel cmdline approach.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for binderfs.
This is required to have separate permissions to allow
access to binder, hwbinder and vndbinder devices which are
relocating to binderfs.
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The return value of snprintf maybe over the size of TMPBUFLEN, use
scnprintf instead in sel_read_class and sel_read_perm.
Signed-off-by: liuyang34 <liuyang34@xiaomi.com>
[PM: cleaned up the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
- performance regression: only get a label reference if the fast
path check fails
- fix aa_xattrs_match() may sleep while holding a RCU lock
- fix bind mounts aborting with -ENOMEM
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2020-01-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor fixes from John Johansen:
- performance regression: only get a label reference if the fast path
check fails
- fix aa_xattrs_match() may sleep while holding a RCU lock
- fix bind mounts aborting with -ENOMEM
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2020-01-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix aa_xattrs_match() may sleep while holding a RCU lock
apparmor: only get a label reference if the fast path check fails
apparmor: fix bind mounts aborting with -ENOMEM
aa_xattrs_match() is unfortunately calling vfs_getxattr_alloc() from a
context protected by an rcu_read_lock. This can not be done as
vfs_getxattr_alloc() may sleep regardles of the gfp_t value being
passed to it.
Fix this by breaking the rcu_read_lock on the policy search when the
xattr match feature is requested and restarting the search if a policy
changes occur.
Fixes: 8e51f9087f ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value")
Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The common fast path check can be done under rcu_read_lock() and
doesn't need a reference count on the label. Only take a reference
count if entering the slow path.
Fixes reported hackbench regression
- sha1 79e178a57d ("Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-12-03' of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor")
hackbench -l (256000/#grp) -g #grp
128 groups 19.679 ±0.90%
- previous sha1 01d1dff646 ("Merge tag 's390-5.5-2' of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux")
hackbench -l (256000/#grp) -g #grp
128 groups 3.1689 ±3.04%
Reported-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Fixes: bce4e7e9c4 ("apparmor: reduce rcu_read_lock scope for aa_file_perm mediation")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
With commit df323337e5 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU
caches, 2019-05-03"), AppArmor code was converted to use memory pools. In
that conversion, a bug snuck into the code that polices bind mounts that
causes all bind mounts to fail with -ENOMEM, as we erroneously error out
if `aa_get_buffer` returns a pointer instead of erroring out when it
does _not_ return a valid pointer.
Fix the issue by correctly checking for valid pointers returned by
`aa_get_buffer` to fix bind mounts with AppArmor.
Fixes: df323337e5 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches")
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
syzbot is reporting that there is a race at tomoyo_stat_update() [1].
Although it is acceptable to fail to track exact number of times policy
was updated, convert to atomic_t because this is not a hot path.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4d7b973972eeed410596e6604580e0133b0fc04
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+efea72d4a0a1d03596cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
