Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for
global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server
functions. The public portion of the structure contains state
that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode.
The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose
definition is private to the security server and contains security
server specific state such as the policy database and SID table.
This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs
(userspace or LSM). It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it
explicitly as needed.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180130' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A small pull request this time, just three patches, and one of these
is just a comment update (swap the FSF physical address for a URL).
The other two patches are small bug fixes found by szybot/syzkaller;
they individual patch descriptions should tell you all you ever wanted
to know"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180130' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: skip bounded transition processing if the policy isn't loaded
selinux: ensure the context is NUL terminated in security_context_to_sid_core()
security: replace FSF address with web source in license notices
We can't do anything reasonable in security_bounded_transition() if we
don't have a policy loaded, and in fact we could run into problems
with some of the code inside expecting a policy. Fix these problems
like we do many others in security/selinux/ss/services.c by checking
to see if the policy is loaded (ss_initialized) and returning quickly
if it isn't.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The syzbot/syzkaller automated tests found a problem in
security_context_to_sid_core() during early boot (before we load the
SELinux policy) where we could potentially feed context strings without
NUL terminators into the strcmp() function.
We already guard against this during normal operation (after the SELinux
policy has been loaded) by making a copy of the context strings and
explicitly adding a NUL terminator to the end. The patch extends this
protection to the early boot case (no loaded policy) by moving the context
copy earlier in security_context_to_sid_core().
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-By: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Seven SELinux patches for v4.15, although five of the seven are small
build fixes and cleanups.
Of the remaining two patches, the only one worth really calling out is
Eric's fix for the SELinux filesystem xattr set/remove code; the other
patch simply converts the SELinux hash table implementation to use
kmem_cache.
Eric's setxattr/removexattr tweak converts SELinux back to calling the
commoncap implementations when the xattr is not SELinux related. The
immediate win is to fixup filesystem capabilities in user namespaces,
but it makes things a bit saner overall; more information in the
commit description"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: remove extraneous initialization of slots_used and max_chain_len
selinux: remove redundant assignment to len
selinux: remove redundant assignment to str
selinux: fix build warning
selinux: fix build warning by removing the unused sid variable
selinux: Perform both commoncap and selinux xattr checks
selinux: Use kmem_cache for hashtab_node
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Variables slots_used and max_chain_len are being initialized to zero
twice. Remove the second set of initializations in the for loop.
Cleans up the clang warnings:
Value stored to 'slots_used' is never read
Value stored to 'max_chain_len' is never read
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The variable len is being set to zero and this value is never
being read since len is being set to a different value just
a few lines later. Remove this redundant assignment. Cleans
up clang warning: Value stored to 'len' is never read
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
During random test as own device to check slub account,
we found some slack memory from hashtab_node(kmalloc-64).
By using kzalloc(), middle of test result like below:
allocated size 240768
request size 45144
slack size 195624
allocation count 3762
So, we want to use kmem_cache_zalloc() and that
can reduce memory size 52byte(slack size/alloc count) per each struct.
Signed-off-by: Kyeongdon Kim <kyeongdon.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As systemd ramps up enabling NNP (NoNewPrivileges) for system services,
it is increasingly breaking SELinux domain transitions for those services
and their descendants. systemd enables NNP not only for services whose
unit files explicitly specify NoNewPrivileges=yes but also for services
whose unit files specify any of the following options in combination with
running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. specifying User= or a
CapabilityBoundingSet= without CAP_SYS_ADMIN): SystemCallFilter=,
SystemCallArchitectures=, RestrictAddressFamilies=, RestrictNamespaces=,
PrivateDevices=, ProtectKernelTunables=, ProtectKernelModules=,
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or RestrictRealtime= as per the systemd.exec(5)
man page.
The end result is bad for the security of both SELinux-disabled and
SELinux-enabled systems. Packagers have to turn off these
options in the unit files to preserve SELinux domain transitions. For
users who choose to disable SELinux, this means that they miss out on
at least having the systemd-supported protections. For users who keep
SELinux enabled, they may still be missing out on some protections
because it isn't necessarily guaranteed that the SELinux policy for
that service provides the same protections in all cases.
commit 7b0d0b40cd ("selinux: Permit bounded transitions under
NO_NEW_PRIVS or NOSUID.") allowed bounded transitions under NNP in
order to support limited usage for sandboxing programs. However,
defining typebounds for all of the affected service domains
is impractical to implement in policy, since typebounds requires us
to ensure that each domain is allowed everything all of its descendant
domains are allowed, and this has to be repeated for the entire chain
of domain transitions. There is no way to clone all allow rules from
descendants to their ancestors in policy currently, and doing so would
be undesirable even if it were practical, as it requires leaking
permissions to objects and operations into ancestor domains that could
weaken their own security in order to allow them to the descendants
(e.g. if a descendant requires execmem permission, then so do all of
its ancestors; if a descendant requires execute permission to a file,
then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires read to a
symbolic link or temporary file, then so do all of its ancestors...).
SELinux domains are intentionally not hierarchical / bounded in this
manner normally, and making them so would undermine their protections
and least privilege.
We have long had a similar tension with SELinux transitions and nosuid
mounts, albeit not as severe. Users often have had to choose between
retaining nosuid on a mount and allowing SELinux domain transitions on
files within those mounts. This likewise leads to unfortunate tradeoffs
in security.
Decouple NNP/nosuid from SELinux transitions, so that we don't have to
make a choice between them. Introduce a nnp_nosuid_transition policy
capability that enables transitions under NNP/nosuid to be based on
a permission (nnp_transition for NNP; nosuid_transition for nosuid)
between the old and new contexts in addition to the current support
for bounded transitions. Domain transitions can then be allowed in
policy without requiring the parent to be a strict superset of all of
its children.
With this change, systemd unit files can be left unmodified from upstream.
SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled users will benefit from retaining any
of the systemd-provided protections. SELinux policy will only need to
be adapted to enable the new policy capability and to allow the
new permissions between domain pairs as appropriate.
NB: Allowing nnp_transition between two contexts opens up the potential
for the old context to subvert the new context by installing seccomp
filters before the execve. Allowing nosuid_transition between two contexts
opens up the potential for a context transition to occur on a file from
an untrusted filesystem (e.g. removable media or remote filesystem). Use
with care.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The allocated size for each ebitmap_node is 192byte by kzalloc().
Then, ebitmap_node size is fixed, so it's possible to use only 144byte
for each object by kmem_cache_zalloc().
It can reduce some dynamic allocation size.
Signed-off-by: Junil Lee <junil0814.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet
management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the
caller has permission to send and receive SMPs on the end port specified
by the device name and port. Add interface to query the SID for a IB
port, which walks the IB_PORT ocontexts to find an entry for the
given name and port.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access
hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the
given subnet prefix. Add an interface to get the PKey SID. Walk the PKey
ocontexts to find an entry for the given subnet prefix and pkey.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Support for Infiniband requires the addition of two new object contexts,
one for infiniband PKeys and another IB Ports. Added handlers to read
and write the new ocontext types when reading or writing a binary policy
representation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded.
For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability
name and the value set in the policy. For policy capabilities that are
set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy
capability index, since this is the only information presently available
in the policy.
Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined
that is not known to the kernel:
SELinux: policy capability network_peer_controls=1
SELinux: policy capability open_perms=1
SELinux: policy capability extended_socket_class=1
SELinux: policy capability always_check_network=0
SELinux: policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0
SELinux: unknown policy capability 5
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Return an error code without storing it in an intermediate variable.
* Delete the local variable "rc" and the jump label "out" which became
unnecessary with this refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace five goto statements (and previous variable assignments) by
direct returns after a memory allocation failure in this function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We removed this initialization as a cleanup but it is probably required.
The concern is that "nel" can be zero. I'm not an expert on SELinux
code but I think it looks possible to write an SELinux policy which
triggers this bug. GCC doesn't catch this, but my static checker does.
Fixes: 9c312e79d6 ("selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable initialisation in range_read()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array
of u32 values.
This fixes the following warning when building with clang:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array
'p_in->perms' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written !…
Thus fix affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the specification of a data type by a pointer dereference
as the parameter for the operator "sizeof" to make the corresponding size
determination a bit safer according to the Linux coding style convention.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The local variable "rt" will be set to an appropriate pointer a bit later.
Thus omit the explicit initialisation at the beginning which became
unnecessary with a previous update step.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The local variable "ft" was set to a null pointer despite of an
immediate reassignment.
Thus remove this statement from the beginning of a loop.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Call the function "kfree" at the end only after it was determined
that the local variable "newgenfs" contained a non-null pointer.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
WARNING: void function return statements are not generally useful
Thus remove such a statement in the affected function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Multiplications for the size determination of memory allocations
indicated that array data structures should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kcalloc".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written !…
Thus fix affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the specification of data structures by pointer dereferences
as the parameter for the operator "sizeof" to make the corresponding size
determination a bit safer.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
WARNING: void function return statements are not generally useful
Thus remove such a statement in the affected function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
* Replace the specification of a data type by a pointer dereference
to make the corresponding size determination a bit safer according to
the Linux coding style convention.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit 1ea0ce4069 ("selinux: allow
changing labels for cgroupfs") broke the Android init program,
which looks up security contexts whenever creating directories
and attempts to assign them via setfscreatecon().
When creating subdirectories in cgroup mounts, this would previously
be ignored since cgroup did not support userspace setting of security
contexts. However, after the commit, SELinux would attempt to honor
the requested context on cgroup directories and fail due to permission
denial. Avoid breaking existing userspace/policy by wrapping this change
with a conditional on a new cgroup_seclabel policy capability. This
preserves existing behavior until/unless a new policy explicitly enables
this capability.
Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Now that %z is standartised in C99 there is no reason to support %Z.
Unlike %L it doesn't even make format strings smaller.
Use BUILD_BUG_ON in a couple ATM drivers.
In case anyone didn't notice lib/vsprintf.o is about half of SLUB which
is in my opinion is quite an achievement. Hopefully this patch inspires
someone else to trim vsprintf.c more.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103230126.GA30170@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Extend SELinux to support distinctions among all network address families
implemented by the kernel by defining new socket security classes
and mapping to them. Otherwise, many sockets are mapped to the generic
socket class and are indistinguishable in policy. This has come up
previously with regard to selectively allowing access to bluetooth sockets,
and more recently with regard to selectively allowing access to AF_ALG
sockets. Guido Trentalancia submitted a patch that took a similar approach
to add only support for distinguishing AF_ALG sockets, but this generalizes
his approach to handle all address families implemented by the kernel.
Socket security classes are also added for ICMP and SCTP sockets.
Socket security classes were not defined for AF_* values that are reserved
but unimplemented in the kernel, e.g. AF_NETBEUI, AF_SECURITY, AF_ASH,
AF_ECONET, AF_SNA, AF_WANPIPE.
Backward compatibility is provided by only enabling the finer-grained
socket classes if a new policy capability is set in the policy; older
policies will behave as before. The legacy redhat1 policy capability
that was only ever used in testing within Fedora for ptrace_child
is reclaimed for this purpose; as far as I can tell, this policy
capability is not enabled in any supported distro policy.
Add a pair of conditional compilation guards to detect when new AF_* values
are added so that we can update SELinux accordingly rather than having to
belatedly update it long after new address families are introduced.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Merge my system logging cleanups, triggered by the broken '\n' patches.
The line continuation handling has been broken basically forever, and
the code to handle the system log records was both confusing and
dubious. And it would do entirely the wrong thing unless you always had
a terminating newline, partly because it couldn't actually see whether a
message was marked KERN_CONT or not (but partly because the LOG_CONT
handling in the recording code was rather confusing too).
This re-introduces a real semantically meaningful KERN_CONT, and fixes
the few places I noticed where it was missing. There are probably more
missing cases, since KERN_CONT hasn't actually had any semantic meaning
for at least four years (other than the checkpatch meaning of "no log
level necessary, this is a continuation line").
This also allows the combination of KERN_CONT and a log level. In that
case the log level will be ignored if the merging with a previous line
is successful, but if a new record is needed, that new record will now
get the right log level.
That also means that you can at least in theory combine KERN_CONT with
the "pr_info()" style helpers, although any use of pr_fmt() prefixing
would make that just result in a mess, of course (the prefix would end
up in the middle of a continuing line).
* printk-cleanups:
printk: make reading the kernel log flush pending lines
printk: re-organize log_output() to be more legible
printk: split out core logging code into helper function
printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines
Long long ago the kernel log buffer was a buffered stream of bytes, very
much like stdio in user space. It supported log levels by scanning the
stream and noticing the log level markers at the beginning of each line,
but if you wanted to print a partial line in multiple chunks, you just
did multiple printk() calls, and it just automatically worked.
Except when it didn't, and you had very confusing output when different
lines got all mixed up with each other. Then you got fragment lines
mixing with each other, or with non-fragment lines, because it was
traditionally impossible to tell whether a printk() call was a
continuation or not.
To at least help clarify the issue of continuation lines, we added a
KERN_CONT marker back in 2007 to mark continuation lines:
4749252776 ("printk: add KERN_CONT annotation").
That continuation marker was initially an empty string, and didn't
actuall make any semantic difference. But it at least made it possible
to annotate the source code, and have check-patch notice that a printk()
didn't need or want a log level marker, because it was a continuation of
a previous line.
To avoid the ambiguity between a continuation line that had that
KERN_CONT marker, and a printk with no level information at all, we then
in 2009 made KERN_CONT be a real log level marker which meant that we
could now reliably tell the difference between the two cases.
5fd29d6ccb ("printk: clean up handling of log-levels and newlines")
and we could take advantage of that to make sure we didn't mix up
continuation lines with lines that just didn't have any loglevel at all.
Then, in 2012, the kernel log buffer was changed to be a "record" based
log, where each line was a record that has a loglevel and a timestamp.
You can see the beginning of that conversion in commits
e11fea92e1 ("kmsg: export printk records to the /dev/kmsg interface")
7ff9554bb5 ("printk: convert byte-buffer to variable-length record buffer")
with a number of follow-up commits to fix some painful fallout from that
conversion. Over all, it took a couple of months to sort out most of
it. But the upside was that you could have concurrent readers (and
writers) of the kernel log and not have lines with mixed output in them.
And one particular pain-point for the record-based kernel logging was
exactly the fragmentary lines that are generated in smaller chunks. In
order to still log them as one recrod, the continuation lines need to be
attached to the previous record properly.
However the explicit continuation record marker that is actually useful
for this exact case was actually removed in aroundm the same time by commit
61e99ab8e3 ("printk: remove the now unnecessary "C" annotation for KERN_CONT")
due to the incorrect belief that KERN_CONT wasn't meaningful. The
ambiguity between "is this a continuation line" or "is this a plain
printk with no log level information" was reintroduced, and in fact
became an even bigger pain point because there was now the whole
record-level merging of kernel messages going on.
This patch reinstates the KERN_CONT as a real non-empty string marker,
so that the ambiguity is fixed once again.
But it's not a plain revert of that original removal: in the four years
since we made KERN_CONT an empty string again, not only has the format
of the log level markers changed, we've also had some usage changes in
this area.
For example, some ACPI code seems to use KERN_CONT _together_ with a log
level, and now uses both the KERN_CONT marker and (for example) a
KERN_INFO marker to show that it's an informational continuation of a
line.
Which is actually not a bad idea - if the continuation line cannot be
attached to its predecessor, without the log level information we don't
know what log level to assign to it (and we traditionally just assigned
it the default loglevel). So having both a log level and the KERN_CONT
marker is not necessarily a bad idea, but it does mean that we need to
actually iterate over potentially multiple markers, rather than just a
single one.
Also, since KERN_CONT was still conceptually needed, and encouraged, but
didn't actually _do_ anything, we've also had the reverse problem:
rather than having too many annotations it has too few, and there is bit
rot with code that no longer marks the continuation lines with the
KERN_CONT marker.
So this patch not only re-instates the non-empty KERN_CONT marker, it
also fixes up the cases of bit-rot I noticed in my own logs.
There are probably other cases where KERN_CONT will be needed to be
added, either because it is new code that never dealt with the need for
KERN_CONT, or old code that has bitrotted without anybody noticing.
That said, we should strive to avoid the need for KERN_CONT. It does
result in real problems for logging, and should generally not be seen as
a good feature. If we some day can get rid of the feature entirely,
because nobody does any fragmented printk calls, that would be lovely.
But until that point, let's at mark the code that relies on the hacky
multi-fragment kernel printk's. Not only does it avoid the ambiguity,
it also annotates code as "maybe this would be good to fix some day".
(That said, particularly during single-threaded bootup, the downsides of
KERN_CONT are very limited. Things get much hairier when you have
multiple threads going on and user level reading and writing logs too).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
