security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid is difficult to follow, especially the
return codes. Try to make the function obvious.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error. For the most part transition to
rc=errno
if (failure)
goto out;
[...]
out:
cleanup()
return rc;
Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
policydb.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error. For the most part transition to
rc=errno
if (failure)
goto out;
[...]
out:
cleanup()
return rc;
Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
/selinux/policy allows a user to copy the policy back out of the kernel.
This patch allows userspace to actually mmap that file and use it directly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was
loaded into the kernel. The patch creates a new selinuxfs file
/selinux/policy which can be read by userspace. The actual policy that is
loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
AVTAB_MAX_SIZE was a define which was supposed to be used in userspace to
define a maximally sized avtab when userspace wasn't sure how big of a table
it needed. It doesn't make sense in the kernel since we always know our table
sizes. The only place it is used we have a more appropiately named define
called AVTAB_MAX_HASH_BUCKETS, use that instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Range transition rules are placed in the hash table in an (almost)
arbitrary order. This patch inserts them in a fixed order to make policy
retrival more predictable.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string. The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen. This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch fixes up coding-style problem at this commit:
4f27a7d49789b04404eca26ccde5f527231d01d5
selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status)
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
While the previous change to the selinux Makefile reduced the window
significantly for this failure, it is still possible to see a compile
failure where cpp starts processing selinux files before the auto
generated flask.h file is completed. This is easily reproduced by
adding the following temporary change to expose the issue everytime:
- cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders ...
+ cmd_flask = sleep 30 ; scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders ...
This failure happens because the creation of the object files in the ss
subdir also depends on flask.h. So simply incorporate them into the
parent Makefile, as the ss/Makefile really doesn't do anything unique.
With this change, compiling of all selinux files is dependent on
completion of the header file generation, and this test case with
the "sleep 30" now confirms it is functioning as expected.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications
read-only mmap(2).
This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space.
struct selinux_kernel_status
{
u32 length; /* length of this structure */
u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */
u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */
u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */
};
When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided
by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce
to keep consistency.
However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses
on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process.
In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of
making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call
to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache.
If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation
messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the
base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing
with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own
worker thread from the module.
If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can
know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce.
A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries
to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it
checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space.
Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing
mode, without any system call invocations.
This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need
to wait for a while if it is odd number.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +
security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
type is not used at all, stop declaring and assigning it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Current selinux policy can have over 3000 types. The type_attr_map in
policy is an array sized by the number of types times sizeof(struct ebitmap)
(12 on x86_64). Basic math tells us the array is going to be of length
3000 x 12 = 36,000 bytes. The largest 'safe' allocation on a long running
system is 16k. Most of the time a 32k allocation will work. But on long
running systems a 64k allocation (what we need) can fail quite regularly.
In order to deal with this I am converting the type_attr_map to use
flex_arrays. Let the library code deal with breaking this into PAGE_SIZE
pieces.
-v2
rework some of the if(!obj) BUG() to be BUG_ON(!obj)
drop flex_array_put() calls and just use a _get() object directly
-v3
make apply to James' tree (drop the policydb_write changes)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Move the reading of ocontext type data out of policydb_read() in a separate
function ocontext_read()
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
move genfs read functionality out of policydb_read() and into a new
function called genfs_read()
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
hashtab_create() only returns NULL on allocation failures to -ENOMEM is
appropriate here.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error. The new code
returns either -ENOMEM, or -EINVAL or it propagates the error codes from
lower level functions next_entry() or hashtab_insert().
next_entry() returns -EINVAL.
hashtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -EEXIST, or -ENOMEM.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
It's better to propagate the error code from avtab_init() instead of
returning -1 (-EPERM). It turns out that avtab_init() never fails so
this patch doesn't change how the code runs but it's still a clean up.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Originally cond_read_node() returned -1 (-EPERM) on errors which was
incorrect. Now it either propagates the error codes from lower level
functions next_entry() or cond_read_av_list() or it returns -ENOMEM or
-EINVAL.
next_entry() returns -EINVAL.
cond_read_av_list() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
After this patch cond_read_av_list() no longer returns -1 for any
errors. It just propagates error code back from lower levels. Those can
either be -EINVAL or -ENOMEM.
I also modified cond_insertf() since cond_read_av_list() passes that as a
function pointer to avtab_read_item(). It isn't used anywhere else.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
These are passed back when the security module gets loaded.
The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error but after this
patch it can return -EINVAL, or -ENOMEM or propagate the error code from
cond_read_node(). cond_read_node() still returns -1 all the time, but I
fix that in a later patch.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The avtab_read_item() function tends to return -1 as a default error
code which is wrong (-1 means -EPERM). I modified it to return
appropriate error codes which is -EINVAL or the error code from
next_entry() or insertf().
next_entry() returns -EINVAL.
insertf() is a function pointer to either avtab_insert() or
cond_insertf().
avtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -ENOMEM, and -EEXIST.
cond_insertf() currently returns -1, but I will fix it in a later patch.
There is code in avtab_read() which translates the -1 returns from
avtab_read_item() to -EINVAL. The translation is no longer needed, so I
removed it.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Move the range transition rule to a separate function, range_read(), rather
than doing it all in policydb_read()
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use kstrdup when the goal of an allocation is copy a string into the
allocated region.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
expression from,to;
expression flag,E1,E2;
statement S;
@@
- to = kmalloc(strlen(from) + 1,flag);
+ to = kstrdup(from, flag);
... when != \(from = E1 \| to = E1 \)
if (to==NULL || ...) S
... when != \(from = E2 \| to = E2 \)
- strcpy(to, from);
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
policy load failure always return EINVAL even if the failure was for some
other reason (usually ENOMEM). This patch passes error codes back up the
stack where they will make their way to userspace. This might help in
debugging future problems with policy load.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reduce MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS so that the avtab allocation is an order 2
allocation rather than an order 4 allocation on x86_64. This
addresses reports of page allocation failures:
http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=126757230625867&w=2https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=570433
Reported-by: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Several places strings tables are used that should be declared
const.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
slab.h is unused in symtab.c, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This fixes corrupted CIPSO packets when SELinux categories greater than 127
are used. The bug occured on the second (and later) loops through the
while; the inner for loop through the ebitmap->maps array used the same
index as the NetLabel catmap->bitmap array, even though the NetLabel bitmap
is twice as long as the SELinux bitmap.
Signed-off-by: Joshua Roys <joshua.roys@gtri.gatech.edu>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch revert the commit of 7d52a155e3
which removed a part of type_attribute_bounds_av as a dead code.
However, at that time, we didn't find out the target side boundary allows
to handle some of pseudo /proc/<pid>/* entries with its process's security
context well.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a couple of sparse warnings for callers of
context_struct_to_string, which takes a *u32, not an *int.
These cases are harmless as the values are not used.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Allow runtime switching between different policy types (e.g. from a MLS/MCS
policy to a non-MLS/non-MCS policy or viceversa).
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Always load the initial SIDs, even in the case of a policy
reload and not just at the initial policy load. This comes
particularly handy after the introduction of a recent
patch for enabling runtime switching between different
policy types, although this patch is in theory independent
from that feature.
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch removes dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av().
Due to the historical reason, the type boundary feature is delivered
from hierarchical types in libsepol, it has supported boundary features
both of subject type (domain; in most cases) and target type.
However, we don't have any actual use cases in bounded target types,
and it tended to make conceptual confusion.
So, this patch removes the dead code to apply boundary checks on the
target types. I makes clear the TYPEBOUNDS restricts privileges of
a certain domain bounded to any other domain.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 43 +++------------------------------------
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Per https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=548145
there are sufficient range transition rules in modern (Fedora) policy to
make mls_compute_sid a significant factor on the shmem file setup path
due to the length of the range_tr list. Replace the simple range_tr
list with a hashtab inside the security server to help mitigate this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If allow_unknown==deny, SELinux treats an undefined kernel security
class as an error condition rather than as a typical permission denial
and thus does not allow permissions on undefined classes even when in
permissive mode. Change the SELinux logic so that this case is handled
as a typical permission denial, subject to the usual permissive mode and
permissive domain handling.
Also drop the 'requested' argument from security_compute_av() and
helpers as it is a legacy of the original security server interface and
is unused.
Changes:
- Handle permissive domains consistently by moving up the test for a
permissive domain.
- Make security_compute_av_user() consistent with security_compute_av();
the only difference now is that security_compute_av() performs mapping
between the kernel-private class and permission indices and the policy
values. In the userspace case, this mapping is handled by libselinux.
- Moved avd_init inside the policy lock.
Based in part on a patch by Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>.
Reported-by: Andrew Worsley <amworsley@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The last return is unreachable, remove the 'return'
in default, let it fall through.
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The size argument to kcalloc should be the size of desired structure,
not the pointer to it.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@expression@
expression *x;
@@
x =
<+...
-sizeof(x)
+sizeof(*x)
...+>// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Historically we've seen cases where permissions are requested for classes
where they do not exist. In particular we have seen CIFS forget to set
i_mode to indicate it is a directory so when we later check something like
remove_name we have problems since it wasn't defined in tclass file. This
used to result in a avc which included the permission 0x2000 or something.
Currently the kernel will deny the operations (good thing) but will not
print ANY information (bad thing). First the auditdeny field is no
extended to include unknown permissions. After that is fixed the logic in
avc_dump_query to output this information isn't right since it will remove
the permission from the av and print the phrase "<NULL>". This takes us
back to the behavior before the classmap rewrite.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Ensure that we release the policy read lock on all exit paths from
security_compute_av.
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Drop remapping of netlink classes and bypass of permission checking
based on netlink message type for policy version < 18. This removes
compatibility code introduced when the original single netlink
security class used for all netlink sockets was split into
finer-grained netlink classes based on netlink protocol and when
permission checking was added based on netlink message type in Linux
2.6.8. The only known distribution that shipped with SELinux and
policy < 18 was Fedora Core 2, which was EOL'd on 2005-04-11.
Given that the remapping code was never updated to address the
addition of newer netlink classes, that the corresponding userland
support was dropped in 2005, and that the assumptions made by the
remapping code about the fixed ordering among netlink classes in the
policy may be violated in the future due to the dynamic class/perm
discovery support, we should drop this compatibility code now.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to
generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h
and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the
security class mapping definitions in classmap.h. Adding new kernel
classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values
upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery
logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private
class and permission indices used outside the security server and the
policy values used within the security server.
The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations;
similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers
is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The
interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel
vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user
suffix.
The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy
values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes;
thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h
definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from
refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going
forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and
classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer
tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to
automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the
classmap.h definitions.
The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and
replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at
policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation
logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic.
The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled
when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old
handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled
when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is
automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions
are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1.
avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the
class and permission names from the kernel-private indices.
The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the
class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the
kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any
userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel
classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match
the kernel-private indices).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
