Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision
code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not
be RCU safe.
This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU
safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is
done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the
avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue.
Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove path.h from sched.h and other files.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
for better maintainability.
- changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
avc_audit_data
- eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.
Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit
can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without
doing the actual dump. This makes it so that the patched version
behaves the same way as the unpatched version.
Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space,
once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the
unpatched.
I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
for better maintainability and for less code duplication.
- changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
avc_audit_data
- eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.
I have tested to make sure that the avcs look the same before and
after this patch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Added a call to free the avc_node_cache when inside selinux_disable because
it should not waste resources allocated during avc_init if SELinux is disabled
and the cache will never be used.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The attached patch adds support to generate audit messages on two cases.
The first one is a case when a multi-thread process tries to switch its
performing security context using setcon(3), but new security context is
not bounded by the old one.
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245311998.599:17): \
op=security_bounded_transition result=denied \
oldcontext=system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 \
newcontext=system_u:system_r:guest_webapp_t:s0
The other one is a case when security_compute_av() masked any permissions
due to the type boundary violation.
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245312836.035:32): \
op=security_compute_av reason=bounds \
scontext=system_u:object_r:user_webapp_t:s0 \
tcontext=system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0:c0 \
tclass=file perms=getattr,open
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context
under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application
to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and
helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request.
When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider
permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process
shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context
also means another thread can easily refer violated information.
The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain
has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign
a per-thread security context.
Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can
never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two
explicit or implicit ways.
The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define
a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of
existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated
name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t".
This feature requires a new policy version.
The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into
kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Formatting and syntax changes
whitespace, tabs to spaces, trailing space
put open { on same line as struct def
remove unneeded {} after if statements
change printk("Lu") to printk("llu")
convert asm/uaccess.h to linux/uaacess.h includes
remove unnecessary asm/bug.h includes
convert all users of simple_strtol to strict_strtol
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code. To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.
(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)
Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In security_get_user_sids, move the transition permission checks
outside of the section holding the policy rdlock, and use the AVC to
perform the checks, calling cond_resched after each one. These
changes should allow preemption between the individual checks and
enable caching of the results. It may however increase the overall
time spent in the function in some cases, particularly in the cache
miss case.
The long term fix will be to take much of this logic to userspace by
exporting additional state via selinuxfs, and ultimately deprecating
and eliminating this interface from the kernel.
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
