forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
06112163f5
make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex indirection. This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
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| .. | ||
| keys | ||
| selinux | ||
| smack | ||
| capability.c | ||
| commoncap.c | ||
| device_cgroup.c | ||
| inode.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| root_plug.c | ||
| security.c | ||