forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
2482abb93e
With eBPF JIT compiler enabled on x86_64, I was able to reliably trigger
the following general protection fault out of an eBPF program with a simple
tail call, f.e. tracex5 (or a stripped down version of it):
[ 927.097918] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[...]
[ 927.100870] task: ffff8801f228b780 ti: ffff880016a64000 task.ti: ffff880016a64000
[ 927.102096] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa002440d>] [<ffffffffa002440d>] 0xffffffffa002440d
[ 927.103390] RSP: 0018:ffff880016a67a68 EFLAGS: 00010006
[ 927.104683] RAX: 5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 927.105921] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88014e438000 RDI: ffff880016a67e00
[ 927.107137] RBP: ffff880016a67c90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 927.108351] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880016a67e00
[ 927.109567] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88026500e460 R15: ffff880220a81520
[ 927.110787] FS: 00007fe7d5c1f740(0000) GS:ffff880265000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 927.112021] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 927.113255] CR2: 0000003e7bbb91a0 CR3: 000000006e04b000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
[ 927.114500] Stack:
[ 927.115737] ffffc90008cdb000 ffff880016a67e00 ffff88026500e460 ffff880220a81520
[ 927.117005] 0000000100000000 000000000000001b ffff880016a67aa8 ffffffff8106c548
[ 927.118276] 00007ffcdaf22e58 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880016a67ff0
[ 927.119543] Call Trace:
[ 927.120797] [<ffffffff8106c548>] ? lookup_address+0x28/0x30
[ 927.122058] [<ffffffff8113d176>] ? __module_text_address+0x16/0x70
[ 927.123314] [<ffffffff8117bf0e>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x3e/0x70
[ 927.124562] [<ffffffff810c1a0f>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x5f/0x80
[ 927.125806] [<ffffffff8102086f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
[ 927.127033] [<ffffffff810f7852>] ? __lock_acquire+0x572/0x2050
[ 927.128254] [<ffffffff810f7852>] ? __lock_acquire+0x572/0x2050
[ 927.129461] [<ffffffff8119edfa>] ? trace_call_bpf+0x3a/0x140
[ 927.130654] [<ffffffff8119ee4a>] trace_call_bpf+0x8a/0x140
[ 927.131837] [<ffffffff8119edfa>] ? trace_call_bpf+0x3a/0x140
[ 927.133015] [<ffffffff8119f008>] kprobe_perf_func+0x28/0x220
[ 927.134195] [<ffffffff811a1668>] kprobe_dispatcher+0x38/0x60
[ 927.135367] [<ffffffff81174b91>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x1/0x230
[ 927.136523] [<ffffffff81061400>] kprobe_ftrace_handler+0xf0/0x150
[ 927.137666] [<ffffffff81174b95>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x5/0x230
[ 927.138802] [<ffffffff8117950c>] ftrace_ops_recurs_func+0x5c/0xb0
[ 927.139934] [<ffffffffa022b0d5>] 0xffffffffa022b0d5
[ 927.141066] [<ffffffff81174b91>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x1/0x230
[ 927.142199] [<ffffffff81174b95>] seccomp_phase1+0x5/0x230
[ 927.143323] [<ffffffff8102c0a4>] syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0xc4/0x150
[ 927.144450] [<ffffffff81174b95>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x5/0x230
[ 927.145572] [<ffffffff8102c0a4>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0xc4/0x150
[ 927.146666] [<ffffffff817f9a9f>] tracesys+0xd/0x44
[ 927.147723] Code: 48 8b 46 10 48 39 d0 76 2c 8b 85 fc fd ff ff 83 f8 20 77 21 83
c0 01 89 85 fc fd ff ff 48 8d 44 d6 80 48 8b 00 48 83 f8 00 74
0a <48> 8b 40 20 48 83 c0 33 ff e0 48 89 d8 48 8b 9d d8 fd ff
ff 4c
[ 927.150046] RIP [<ffffffffa002440d>] 0xffffffffa002440d
The code section with the instructions that traps points into the eBPF JIT
image of the root program (the one invoking the tail call instruction).
Using bpf_jit_disasm -o on the eBPF root program image:
[...]
4e: mov -0x204(%rbp),%eax
8b 85 fc fd ff ff
54: cmp $0x20,%eax <--- if (tail_call_cnt > MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT)
83 f8 20
57: ja 0x000000000000007a
77 21
59: add $0x1,%eax <--- tail_call_cnt++
83 c0 01
5c: mov %eax,-0x204(%rbp)
89 85 fc fd ff ff
62: lea -0x80(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax <--- prog = array->prog[index]
48 8d 44 d6 80
67: mov (%rax),%rax
48 8b 00
6a: cmp $0x0,%rax <--- check for NULL
48 83 f8 00
6e: je 0x000000000000007a
74 0a
70: mov 0x20(%rax),%rax <--- GPF triggered here! fetch of bpf_func
48 8b 40 20 [ matches <48> 8b 40 20 ... from above ]
74: add $0x33,%rax <--- prologue skip of new prog
48 83 c0 33
78: jmpq *%rax <--- jump to new prog insns
ff e0
[...]
The problem is that rax has 5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a, which suggests a tail call
jump to map slot 0 is pointing to a poisoned page. The issue is the following:
lea instruction has a wrong offset, i.e. it should be ...
lea 0x80(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax
... but it actually seems to be ...
lea -0x80(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax
... where 0x80 is offsetof(struct bpf_array, prog), thus the offset needs
to be positive instead of negative. Disassembling the interpreter, we btw
similarly do:
[...]
c88: lea 0x80(%rax,%rdx,8),%rax <--- prog = array->prog[index]
48 8d 84 d0 80 00 00 00
c90: add $0x1,%r13d
41 83 c5 01
c94: mov (%rax),%rax
48 8b 00
[...]
Now the other interesting fact is that this panic triggers only when things
like CONFIG_LOCKDEP are being used. In that case offsetof(struct bpf_array,
prog) starts at offset 0x80 and in non-CONFIG_LOCKDEP case at offset 0x50.
Reason is that the work_struct inside struct bpf_map grows by 48 bytes in my
case due to the lockdep_map member (which also has CONFIG_LOCK_STAT enabled
members).
Changing the emitter to always use the 4 byte displacement in the lea
instruction fixes the panic on my side. It increases the tail call instruction
emission by 3 more byte, but it should cover us from various combinations
(and perhaps other future increases on related structures).
After patch, disassembly:
[...]
9e: lea 0x80(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax <--- CONFIG_LOCKDEP/CONFIG_LOCK_STAT
48 8d 84 d6 80 00 00 00
a6: mov (%rax),%rax
48 8b 00
[...]
[...]
9e: lea 0x50(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax <--- No CONFIG_LOCKDEP
48 8d 84 d6 50 00 00 00
a6: mov (%rax),%rax
48 8b 00
[...]
Fixes:
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| bpf_jit_comp.c | ||
| bpf_jit.S | ||
| Makefile | ||