A malicious USB device may feed in carefully crafted min/max/res values,
so that the inner loop in parse_uac2_sample_rate_range() could run for
a long time or even never terminate, e.g., given max = INT_MAX.
Also nr_rates could be a large integer, which causes an integer overflow
in the subsequent call to kmalloc() in parse_audio_format_rates_v2().
Thus, kmalloc() would allocate a smaller buffer than expected, leading
to a memory corruption.
To exploit the two vulnerabilities, an attacker needs physical access
to the machine to plug in a malicious USB device.
This patch makes two changes.
1) The type of "rate" is changed to unsigned int, so that the loop could
stop once "rate" is larger than INT_MAX.
2) Limit nr_rates to 1024.
Suggested-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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