forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
576dd46450
Along with the write access to the cgroup.procs or tasks file, cgroup has required the writer's euid, unless root, to match [s]uid of the target process or task. On cgroup v1, this is necessary because there's nothing preventing a delegatee from pulling in tasks or processes from all over the system. If a user has a cgroup subdirectory delegated to it, the user would have write access to the cgroup.procs or tasks file. If there are no further checks than file write access check, the user would be able to pull processes from all over the system into its subhierarchy which is clearly not the intended behavior. The matching [s]uid requirement partially prevents this problem by allowing a delegatee to pull in the processes that belongs to it. This isn't a sufficient protection however, because a user would still be able to jump processes across two disjoint sub-hierarchies that has been delegated to them. cgroup v2 resolves the issue by requiring the writer to have access to the common ancestor of the cgroup.procs file of the source and target cgroups. This confines each delegatee to their own sub-hierarchy proper and bases all permission decisions on the cgroup filesystem rather than having to pull in explicit uid matching. cgroup v2 has still been applying the matching [s]uid requirement just for historical reasons. On cgroup2, the requirement doesn't serve any purpose while unnecessarily complicating the permission model. Let's drop it. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> |
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| .. | ||
| cgroup-internal.h | ||
| cgroup-v1.c | ||
| cgroup.c | ||
| cpuset.c | ||
| freezer.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| namespace.c | ||
| pids.c | ||