forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
577eebeae3
-fstack-protector uses a special per-cpu "stack canary" value. gcc generates special code in each function to test the canary to make sure that the function's stack hasn't been overrun. On x86-64, this is simply an offset of %gs, which is the usual per-cpu base segment register, so setting it up simply requires loading %gs's base as normal. On i386, the stack protector segment is %gs (rather than the usual kernel percpu %fs segment register). This requires setting up the full kernel GDT and then loading %gs accordingly. We also need to make sure %gs is initialized when bringing up secondary cpus too. To keep things consistent, we do the full GDT/segment register setup on both architectures. Because we need to avoid -fstack-protected code before setting up the GDT and because there's no way to disable it on a per-function basis, several files need to have stack-protector inhibited. [ Impact: allow Xen booting with stack-protector enabled ] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> |
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blackfin | ||
cris | ||
frv | ||
h8300 | ||
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m32r | ||
m68k | ||
m68knommu | ||
microblaze | ||
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mn10300 | ||
parisc | ||
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sh | ||
sparc | ||
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xtensa | ||
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Kconfig |