kernel_optimize_test/net/bluetooth/smp.c
Anderson Briglia 88ba43b662 Bluetooth: Add simple SMP pairing negotiation
This implementation only exchanges SMP messages between the Host and the
Remote. No keys are being generated. TK and STK generation will be
provided in further patches.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
2011-06-13 15:48:22 -03:00

244 lines
5.8 KiB
C

/*
BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
published by the Free Software Foundation;
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
*/
#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code,
u16 dlen, void *data)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct l2cap_hdr *lh;
int len;
len = L2CAP_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(code) + dlen;
if (len > conn->mtu)
return NULL;
skb = bt_skb_alloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
lh = (struct l2cap_hdr *) skb_put(skb, L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
lh->len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(code) + dlen);
lh->cid = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP);
memcpy(skb_put(skb, sizeof(code)), &code, sizeof(code));
memcpy(skb_put(skb, dlen), data, dlen);
return skb;
}
static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = smp_build_cmd(conn, code, len, data);
BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
if (!skb)
return;
hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0);
}
static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
rp->io_capability = 0x00;
rp->oob_flag = 0x00;
rp->max_key_size = 16;
rp->init_key_dist = 0x00;
rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
}
static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
if (conn->hcon->out) {
struct smp_cmd_pairing_random random;
memset(&random, 0, sizeof(random));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
&random);
} else {
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm confirm;
memset(&confirm, 0, sizeof(confirm));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(confirm),
&confirm);
}
}
static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing_random cp;
BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(cp));
if (conn->hcon->out) {
/* FIXME: start encryption */
} else {
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
}
static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
cp.io_capability = 0x00;
cp.oob_flag = 0x00;
cp.max_key_size = 16;
cp.init_key_dist = 0x00;
cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
cp.auth_req = rp->auth_req & (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
{
__u8 authreq;
BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, conn->hcon, sec_level);
switch (sec_level) {
case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
/* Encrypted, no MITM protection */
authreq = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM;
break;
case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
/* Bonding, MITM protection */
authreq = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM;
break;
case BT_SECURITY_LOW:
default:
return 1;
}
if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
cp.io_capability = 0x00;
cp.oob_flag = 0x00;
cp.max_key_size = 16;
cp.init_key_dist = 0x00;
cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
cp.auth_req = authreq;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
} else {
struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
cp.auth_req = authreq;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
return 0;
}
int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__u8 code = skb->data[0];
__u8 reason;
int err = 0;
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
switch (code) {
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
break;
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
default:
BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
&reason);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}