forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
66f8e2f03c
This replaces the reverse table lookup and reverse cache with a
hashtable which improves cache-miss reverse-lookup times from
O(n) to O(1)* and maintains the same performance as a reverse
cache hit.
This reduces the time needed to add a new sidtab entry from ~500us
to 5us on a Pixel 3 when there are ~10,000 sidtab entries.
The implementation uses the kernel's generic hashtable API,
It uses the context's string represtation as the hash source,
and the kernels generic string hashing algorithm full_name_hash()
to reduce the string to a 32 bit value.
This change also maintains the improvement introduced in
commit ee1a84fdfe
("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance") which removed the need to keep the current sidtab
locked during policy reload. It does however introduce periodic
locking of the target sidtab while converting the hashtable. Sidtab
entries are never modified or removed, so the context struct stored
in the sid_to_context tree can also be used for the context_to_sid
hashtable to reduce memory usage.
This bug was reported by:
- On the selinux bug tracker.
BUG: kernel softlockup due to too many SIDs/contexts #37
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/37
- Jovana Knezevic on Android's bugtracker.
Bug: 140252993
"During multi-user performance testing, we create and remove users
many times. selinux_android_restorecon_pkgdir goes from 1ms to over
20ms after about 200 user creations and removals. Accumulated over
~280 packages, that adds a significant time to user creation,
making perf benchmarks unreliable."
* Hashtable lookup is only O(1) when n < the number of buckets.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reported-by: Jovana Knezevic <jovanak@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: subj tweak, removed changelog from patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
206 lines
5.0 KiB
C
206 lines
5.0 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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/*
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* A security context is a set of security attributes
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* associated with each subject and object controlled
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* by the security policy. Security contexts are
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* externally represented as variable-length strings
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* that can be interpreted by a user or application
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* with an understanding of the security policy.
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* Internally, the security server uses a simple
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* structure. This structure is private to the
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* security server and can be changed without affecting
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* clients of the security server.
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*
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* Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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*/
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#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
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#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
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#include "ebitmap.h"
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#include "mls_types.h"
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#include "security.h"
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/*
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* A security context consists of an authenticated user
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* identity, a role, a type and a MLS range.
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*/
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struct context {
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u32 user;
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u32 role;
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u32 type;
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u32 len; /* length of string in bytes */
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struct mls_range range;
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char *str; /* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
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u32 hash; /* a hash of the string representation */
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};
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static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
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{
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memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
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}
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static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
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{
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int rc;
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dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
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rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
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if (rc)
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goto out;
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dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
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rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
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if (rc)
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ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
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out:
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the low level of 'src'.
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*/
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static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
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{
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int rc;
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dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
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rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
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if (rc)
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goto out;
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dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
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rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
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if (rc)
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ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
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out:
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'.
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*/
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static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
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{
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int rc;
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dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
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rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
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if (rc)
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goto out;
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dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
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rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
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if (rc)
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ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
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out:
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return rc;
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}
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static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst,
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struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
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{
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struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range, *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range;
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int rc = 0;
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if (r1->level[1].sens < r2->level[0].sens ||
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r2->level[1].sens < r1->level[0].sens)
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/* These ranges have no common sensitivities */
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Take the greatest of the low */
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dr->level[0].sens = max(r1->level[0].sens, r2->level[0].sens);
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/* Take the least of the high */
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dr->level[1].sens = min(r1->level[1].sens, r2->level[1].sens);
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rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[0].cat,
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&r1->level[0].cat, &r2->level[0].cat);
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if (rc)
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goto out;
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rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[1].cat,
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&r1->level[1].cat, &r2->level[1].cat);
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if (rc)
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goto out;
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out:
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return rc;
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}
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static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
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{
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return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
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ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat, &c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
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(c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
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ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[1].cat, &c2->range.level[1].cat));
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}
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static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
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{
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ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
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ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
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mls_context_init(c);
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}
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static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
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{
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memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
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}
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static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
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{
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int rc;
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dst->user = src->user;
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dst->role = src->role;
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dst->type = src->type;
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if (src->str) {
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dst->str = kstrdup(src->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (!dst->str)
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return -ENOMEM;
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dst->len = src->len;
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} else {
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dst->str = NULL;
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dst->len = 0;
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}
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rc = mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
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if (rc) {
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kfree(dst->str);
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return rc;
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}
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dst->hash = src->hash;
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return 0;
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}
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static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
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{
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c->user = c->role = c->type = c->hash = 0;
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kfree(c->str);
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c->str = NULL;
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c->len = 0;
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mls_context_destroy(c);
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}
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static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
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{
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if (c1->hash && c2->hash && (c1->hash != c2->hash))
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return 0;
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if (c1->len && c2->len)
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return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
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if (c1->len || c2->len)
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return 0;
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return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
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(c1->role == c2->role) &&
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(c1->type == c2->type) &&
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mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
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}
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static inline unsigned int context_compute_hash(const char *s)
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{
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return full_name_hash(NULL, s, strlen(s));
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}
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#endif /* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
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