kernel_optimize_test/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
Linus Torvalds 3868772b99 A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new
document on perf security, more Italian translations, more
 improvements to the memory-management docs, improvements to the
 pathname lookup documentation, and the usual array of smaller
 fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet:
 "A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new document
  on perf security, more Italian translations, more improvements to the
  memory-management docs, improvements to the pathname lookup
  documentation, and the usual array of smaller fixes.

  As is often the case, there are a few reaches outside of
  Documentation/ to adjust kerneldoc comments"

* tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (38 commits)
  docs: improve pathname-lookup document structure
  configfs: fix wrong name of struct in documentation
  docs/mm-api: link slab_common.c to "The Slab Cache" section
  slab: make kmem_cache_create{_usercopy} description proper kernel-doc
  doc:process: add links where missing
  docs/core-api: make mm-api.rst more structured
  x86, boot: documentation whitespace fixup
  Documentation: devres: note checking needs when converting
  doc🇮🇹 add some process/* translations
  doc🇮🇹 fixes in process/1.Intro
  Documentation: convert path-lookup from markdown to resturctured text
  Documentation/admin-guide: update admin-guide index.rst
  Documentation/admin-guide: introduce perf-security.rst file
  scripts/kernel-doc: Fix struct and struct field attribute processing
  Documentation: dev-tools: Fix typos in index.rst
  Correct gen_init_cpio tool's documentation
  Document /proc/pid PID reuse behavior
  Documentation: update path-lookup.md for parallel lookups
  Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst"
  dmaengine: Add mailing list address to the documentation
  ...
2018-12-29 11:21:49 -08:00

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.. _securitybugs:
Security bugs
=============
Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd
like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the
Linux kernel security team.
Contact
-------
The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
<security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers
who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the
security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
understand and fix the security vulnerability.
As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in
admin-guide/reporting-bugs.rst if you are unclear about what
information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
made public.
Disclosure and embargoed information
------------------------------------
The security list is not a disclosure channel. For that, see Coordination
below.
Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts. Fixes
for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time. The
only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
coordination.
While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
reporter. This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
identity of the reporter.
In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed. All other
information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
lifted, in perpetuity.
Coordination
------------
Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
CVE assignment
--------------
The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
message if the reporter agrees.
Non-disclosure agreements
-------------------------
The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
to enter any non-disclosure agreements.