Gustavo A. R. Silva 5ae4f61f01 ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities ... ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>		2018-12-19 14:34:02 +01:00
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emu10k1_callback.c
emu10k1_main.c
emu10k1_patch.c
emu10k1_synth_local.h
emu10k1_synth.c
emu10k1.c
emu10k1x.c
emufx.c
emumixer.c
emumpu401.c
emupcm.c
emuproc.c
io.c
irq.c
Makefile
memory.c
p16v.c
p16v.h
p17v.h
timer.c
tina2.h
voice.c