Ondrej Mosnacek 4348d3b502 perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call ... commit 08ef1af4de5fe7de9c6d69f1e22e51b66e385d9b upstream. Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM, it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation. SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission ("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored generates a bogus permission check and audit record. Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when its result would be honored. Fixes: b0c8fdc7fd ("lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210224215628.192519-1-omosnace@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>		2021-05-07 11:04:33 +02:00
..
callchain.c	uaccess: add force_uaccess_{begin,end} helpers	2020-08-12 10:57:59 -07:00
core.c	perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call	2021-05-07 11:04:33 +02:00
hw_breakpoint.c
internal.h	perf: Optimize get_recursion_context()	2020-11-09 18:12:34 +01:00
Makefile
ring_buffer.c	perf: Reduce stack usage of perf_output_begin()	2020-11-09 18:12:33 +01:00
uprobes.c	task_work: cleanup notification modes	2020-10-17 15:05:30 -06:00